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ONLINE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
AGREEMENTS:
BOUND BY THE WEB
JENNIFER FEMMINELLA
INTRODUCTION
Internet usage may have more implications and restrictions
than users previously thought. In fact, clicking on links and
navigating through websites may be analogous to signing on the
dotted line of a terms of usage contract. Online websites have
increasingly begun displaying these agreements on their
websites, although their validity is still under review by courts.
While software and online downloads may be timesavers and
enhance productivity, the producers of these technologies have
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had problems with pirating and illegal copying.l In copyright
law, the first sale doctrine states that once the copy of the work is
sold, the new owner can do with it as they please, including
copying for private use.2  While this may not have major
implications for print media,3 online information and software
have much greater copying potential.4 Therefore, a software
producer could conceivably sell only a few copies of his or her
work before free copies are available through alternative
sources.
5
To combat the problem of massive copying, software providers
began including terms and agreements in their packaging,
including the classification of the transaction as a use license and
I See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyrigbt
Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 569 (2001) (noting that while technology makes access to
software easier, it also facilitates illegal copying); see also Michael J. Madison, Legal-
Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1038-39
(1998) (affirming concerns that if copyright law applied to software, first sale doctrine
does not prevent piracy because of easy copying capabilities); National Research Council,
The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 951,
953 (2001) (stating that average computer users could easily copy today what would have
previously required significant investment to copy).
2 The first sale doctrine limits the copyright owner's control over copies of the work to
their first sale or transfer. Once the work is sold or legally transferred, the copyright
owner's interest in the material object is exhausted; and the owner of the copy can dispose
of it as he or she sees fit. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 310
(3d ed. 1999). Additionally, there is an understanding among consumers that some
photocopying of books is permissible as long as there is no personal financial reward,
however, this practice may not translate well to software copying. Madison, supra note 1,
at 1038-39. The first sale doctrine allows purchasers to dispose of copyrighted works as
they please. Joshua H. Foley, Enter the Librar. Creating a Digital Lending Right 16
CONN. J. INT'L L. 369, 372 (2001). Otherwise law abiding citizens have demonstrated no
reluctance to copy software illegally. Halpern, supra note 1, at 570.
3 See Madison, supra note 1, at 1084 (stating that for books, informal estimates of
legal doctrines concerning improper use and access have been "close enough" to maintain
appropriate balance between protection and nonconsensual use). See generally Halpern,
supra note 1, at 569 (suggesting that current legal safeguards for copyrighted physical
material are sufficient); Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet
Age: The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management 11 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT.
LAw 1, 2 (2001) (implying that illegal printing of books is no longer troublesome).
4 See David A. Kessler, Illusion of Piivacr. The Use and Abuse of Ex Parte
Impoundment in Computer Solware Copyright Cases, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 269, 278
(1997) (explaining availability of inexpensive copying equipment and lack of copy
protection measures in software industry); see also Foley, supra note 2, at 372 (suggesting
that current controls on illegal copying of software may be insufficient); Kramarsky, supra
note 3, at 3 (highlighting that software copyright holders view advances in technology as
threats to their intellectual property).
5 See Halpern, supra note 1, at 570 (noting that "pirates" illegally copy commercial
CDs and sell them to "regular" customers); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to File-
sharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1136 (2001) (outlining various
ways personal users become illegal copiers and distributors of copyrighted software). See
generally Madison, supra note 1, at 1084-85 (asserting that many Internet users believe
that material posted online is intended to be public and not under any copyright
restrictions).
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not as a sale.6 By terming the transaction a license, the producer
can not only avoid any first sale problems, but also attach other
conditions of use onto that license and further restrict how the
software can be used.7 These licenses are called shrink-wrap
licenses 8 because although the packaging contains notice of the
agreement inside, the entire agreement can only be viewed after
buying the product and breaking through the plastic shrink-wrap
packaging. 9 Similar agreements have also appeared online.
These include click-wrap agreements,10 where the user must click
"I agree" to the terms of the agreement on their screen before
they are able to enter the websites,'l and web-wrap
6 See Ajay Ayyappan, UCITA: Uniformity at the Price of Fairness, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2471, 2475 (2001) (noting that software transactions are structured as licenses, not
sales); see also Stephen T. Keohane, Mass Market Licensing, 652 PRAC. L. INST. PAT. 437,
443 (2001) (affirming that accepted business model for software industry is to license
product usage in order to easily determine rights and obligations of parties); Kramarsky,
supra note 3, at 1 n.1 (stating that software is not sold, but is licensed).
7 See Brian F. Fitzgerald, Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property
in the Digital Architecture, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 372 (2001) (noting that
software licenses can restrict licensee's use of software); see also Scott J. Spooner, The
Validation of Shrink-Wrap and Click-Wrap Licenses by Virginia's UCITA, 7 RiCH. J.L. &
TECH. 27, *4 (2001) (stating that software licenses define terms of use of software);
Stephen P. Tarolli, The Future of Information Commerce Under Contemporary Contract
and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1648 (1997) (asserting that licenses
claim to grant possession but not ownership, which enables producers to place restrictions
and conditions on use of software or online content).
8 See Ryan J. Casamiquela, Business Law: Contractual Assent and Enforceability in
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 477 (2002) (defining "shrink-wrap" licenses as
those licenses enclosed within software packaging); see also Batya Goodman, Honey, I
Shrink-Wrapped The Consumer: The Shrink- Wrap Agreement As An Adhesion Contract,
21 CARDozO L. REV. 319, 319 n.4 (1999) (explaining plastic covering on outside wrapping
of a product called "shrink-wrap" is where these agreements get their names); Spooner,
supra note 7, at *4 (noting that "shrink-wrap" licenses generally refer to retail software
packages that are covered in plastic or cellophane).
9 See Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 477 (implying that purchasers must open
software packaging to view terms of "shrink-wrap" license); see also Goodman, supra note
8, at 319 n.4 (asserting inability to read entire license until package is opened); Spooner,
supra note 7, at *4 (recognizing that purchasers cannot review terms of "shrink-wrap"
licenses until package is opened).
10 See Symposium, Protecting Software and Information on the Interne 3 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 2 para. 22 (1997) (comments by Pamela Samuelson) (explaining that with
Internet servers, customers can be made to assent to terms of a license by clicking accept
button, before they are able to download programs); see also Casamiquela, supra note 8,
at 475 (noting that "click-wrap" licenses are online agreements); Susan Y. Chao, District
Court for the Central District of California Holds that a Web- Wrap Site License Does Not
Equate to an Enforceable Contract, 54 SMU L. REV. 439, 442 n.36, (2001) (asserting that
contracts where website visitors must click "I accept" button are generally "click-wrap"
licenses).
11 See Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 475 (stating that consumers must click "I agree"
before software license takes effect); Goodman, supra note 8, at 319 (illustrating how user
must "click through" screen prompts before entering website); Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at
372 (confirming that users attempting to access software online must click on button prior
to use of program).
2003]
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agreements, 12 where the terms are usually listed on a link from
the producer's homepage. 13
There has not yet been any legislation concerning the validity
of wrap agreements or regulating their application.14 Recently,
the Copyright Office officially stated that any legislation is
premature at this time.15 However, case law has held shrink-
wrap licensing agreements valid.16 ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg &
Silken Mountain Web Services Inc.17 has served as a model for
litigation involving shrink-wrap licenses,I8 and outlines several
policy considerations for determining the enforceability of those
particular license agreements.
12 See Chao, supra note 10, at 440 n.7 (asserting that web-wrap agreements are
primarily characterized by their placement, and that these licenses are substantive
agreements merely displayed on home pages which clarify what are authorized uses of
website information). See generally Ayyappan, supra note 6, at 2493 (recognizing that
terms of "web-wrap" licenses are generally presented post-sale); Casamiquela, supra note
8, at 476 (characterizing "web-wrap" agreement as "browse-wrap" agreement where
vendors utilize small links to software license).
13 See Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 476 (noting that vendor may tuck "web-wrap"
link into places where consumers are unlikely to notice them); Chao, supra note 10, at 439
n.36 (asserting that web-wrap agreements are primarily characterized by their
placement). See generallyAyyappan, supra note 6, at 2493 (recognizing use of "web-wrap"
licenses).
14 See Chao, supra note 10, at 439 (highlighting that website owners only have ProCD
and other cursory illustrations to guide them in developing web-wrap agreements). See
generally Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 372 (noting that contract law needs to be infused
with regulation). But see Spooner, supra note 7, at *4 n.9 (highlighting fact that Virginia
became first state to enact legislation intended to regulate "wrap" licenses).
15 Executive Summary: Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Section 104 Report,
available at http://wwwloc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/dmcaexecutive.html
(stating that while contract and copyright law has always coexisted, the increasing ability
of rights holders to unilaterally impose contractual provisions increases the probability
that these rights holders will determine landscape of consumer privileges in the future
rather than Congress).
16 See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg & Silken Mountain Web Services Inc, 86 F.3d 1447,
1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating shrink-wrap agreements are valid); see also Hill v. Gateway
2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1151(7th Cir. 1997) (holding arbitration clause in shrink-wrap
agreement enforceable because user didn't object before using computer); Jessica Litman,
The Tales that Article 2B Tells, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 931, 934 n. 14 (1997) (explaining
that ProCD was first case to hold shrink-wrap enforceable, but since ProCD case law has
been mixed). But see Symposium, Protecting Software and Information on the Internet,
supra note 10, at para. 21 (comments of Pamela Samuelson) (proposing that before
ProCD, courts decided not enforce shrink-wrap agreements mainly because there is no
agreement by consumer at time of purchase to those terms of license); Keohane, supra
note 6, at 444 (affirming that although more recently courts have held shrink-wrap
enforceable, there has been no clear approach as to validity of shrink-wrap licenses with
some courts holding them invalid and unenforceable).
17 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
18 Id. at 1455 (enforcing shrink-wrap license for first time). See Litman, supra note
16, at 934 n.14 (naming ProCD as leading case to enforce shrink-wrap licenses). But see
Klocek v. Gateway Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1339-40 (D.Kan. 2000) (stating that Kansas
and Missouri courts probably would not follow ProCD).
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Additionally, several cases have highlighted the more recent
nuance of web-wrap license agreements, also called browse-wrap
license agreements, including Pofistar v. Gigmania,19 Specht v.
Netscape Communications, Corp.,20 and Thcketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc.21  These cases distinguished web-wrap
agreements from shrink-wrap agreements, either holding them
unenforceable or withholding judgment at that time.22 After
looking closer at web-wrap agreements and applying the policy
considerations for validity laid out in ProCD, it is clear that these
agreements should be held invalid and unenforceable.
In this paper I will discuss the three different forms of online
and software agreements, and the mutual assent problems web-
wraps pose. Additionally, I will look at the consumer protections
currently in force, including market competition, the policy
considerations that some courts have used in determining the
enforceability of these agreements, and legislative attempts to
address these new online contracts.
THE AGREEMENTS
Shrink-wrap
Shrink-wrap agreements evolved because of the initial
uncertainty that accompanied the application of copyright law to
software. 23 Shrink-wrap licenses get their name from the usual
19 170 F.Supp.2d 974, 980-81 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (hesitating to rule on enforceability of
browse wrap license agreements).
20 150 F.Supp.2d 585, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (determining that this agreement was
more similar to browse wrap agreement discussed in Polistar than typical shrink-wrap
agreement).
21 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2000) (asserting that
agreement involved was not shrink-wrap agreement, although court never identified what
kind of agreement it was).
22 Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 595 (holding agreement unenforceable); Pollstar, 170
F.Supp.2d at 980-81 (hesitating to make any decision on validity of web-wrap agreement);
Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (holding agreement unenforceable).
23 Software licenses in general and particularly shrink-wrap developed because
people were uncertain about how to apply the first sale doctrine to packaged software.
Madison, supra note 1, at 1038. The first sale doctrine limits the copyright owner's
control over copies of the work to their first sale or transfer. Once the work is lawfully
sold or transferred legally, the copyright owner's interest in the material object is
exhausted; and the owner of the copy can dispose of it as he or she sees fit. LEAFFER,
supra note 2, at 310. This was problematic with software because of the easy copying
capabilities and piracy concerns. Madison, supra note 1, at 1039. The acceptable business
model for the software industry to solve this dilemma is to make the product available
2003]
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plastic or cellophane wrap that retail software is packaged in.24
By putting notice of a license agreement on the outside of the
package, a vendor can bind a user to the terms of the agreement
when the purchaser simply opens the box.25 Basically, shrink-
wrap licenses create a contract between the software producer
and the software user without negotiating with each user, so the
producer can have some control over how the product is used and
distributed.2 6 The fears and concerns of the software producers
were assuaged, however, when Congress officially ruled on the
applicability of software programs to copyright law.2 7
However, Congressional approval did not give any guidance as
to the enforceability of the license agreements that regulated
their sales. 28 It was not until ProCD that the precarious ground
subject to licenses, which state the rights and obligations of both parties. Keohane, supra
note 6, at 443.
24 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 8, at 319 n.4 (explaining plastic covering on outside
wrapping of product called "shrink-wrap" is where these agreements get their names);
James D. Hornbuckle, The Uniform Computer Transaction Act: State Legislatures Should
Take a Critical Look Before Clicking Away Consumer Protections, 23 WHITTIER L.REV.
839, 840 (2002) (describing how manufacturing practice of shrinking cellophane around
packages resulted in term "shrink-wrap"); Spooner, supra note 7, at *4 (describing shrink-
wrap as plastic covered software packages).
25 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg & Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., 86 F.3d
1447,1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that some vendors have written licenses that
become effective as soon as customer tears wrapping from package); see also Protecting
Software and Information on the Internet, supra note 10, para. 22 (citing to ProCd
language); Spooner, supra note 7, at *4-5 (analyzing the enforceability of shrink-wrap
agreements).
26 See Madison, supra note 1, at 1039 (asserting that shrink-wrap licenses create
contractual privity); Page M. Kaufman, Note, The Enforceability of State "Shrink-wrap"
License Statutes in Light ofVault Corp. v Quaid Software Ltd., 74 CORNELL L.REV. 222,
223 (1988) (explaining how opening plastic on package creates acceptance with shrink-
wrap agreements). See generally Spooner, supra note 7, at *5-6 (analyzing enforceability
of shrink-wrap agreements).
27 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, New Intellectual Property, Information Technology,
and Security in Borderless Commerce: Legal Protection for Sotware Still a Work in
Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L.REv. 445, 447 (2002) (discussing Congress's conclusion that
software was copyrightable both in source code and object code forms); Madison, supra
note 1, at 1040 (explaining that Congress clarified that software is protected by copyright
law and first sale doctrine did not authorize renting of computer software); Frank J. Pita,
Reconciling Reverse Engineering and Conflicting Shrink-wrap License Terms Under
UCC. Article 2B." A Patent Law Solution, 14 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 465, 468
(1998) (explaining how copyright protection for software resulted from Congressional
action in 1980).
28 See generally, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 48 (D.
Mass. 1990) (stating designation "works of authorship" is not meant to be limited to
traditional works of authorship such as novels or plays, rather, Congress used this phrase
to extend copyright to new methods of expression as they evolve); David A. Einhorn,
Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The Debate Continues, 38 IDEA 383, 383-84 (1998) (analyzing
issues relevant to enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 27, at
445 (describing debate between conflicting views that software is too strictly regulated
with view that stricter regulation is needed).
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of shrink-wrap agreements was given any standing.29 ProCD
involved a compilation of telephone directories offered on a
computer database.30 For nonretail buyers, ProCD offered this
information as a way to avoid calling long-distance information.31
The general public could get this information at a low price,
while retailers, manufacturers and others using the information
for business uses had to pay a higher price.32 To assure that this
price discrimination practice was enforced, ProCD used a shrink-
wrap license. 33 The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, purchased
the product and then made the information available over the
Internet for a price cheaper than ProCD was charging -- in direct
violation of the terms of the shrink-wrap.34
29 See Litman, supra note 16, at 934 n. 14 (noting that ProCD is first case to hold that
shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable, and that before ProCd many courts deemed these
licenses unenforceable). But see Madison, supra note 1, at 1026 n.3 (stating that previous
courts called shrink-wrap practice into question, but did not invalidate them entirely).
See generaly Spooner, supra note 7, at *6-7 (chronicling development of case law on this
subject).
30 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449 (stating facts of case). See Brett L. Tolman, Note, ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg.: The End Does Not Justify the Means in Federal Copy~ight Analysis,
1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 303, 314 (1998) (explaining ProCD's database of telephone
directories).
31 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449 (noting that service would be potentially cheaper for
nonretail users). See David S. Kerpel, Case Summary, ProCD, Inc. v. Matthew Zeidenberg
& Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., 83F3d1447(7th Cir. 1996), 7 J. ART & ENT. LAW
167, 167 (1996) (noting "the general public could use the database as a substitute for
calling long distance information"); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal
Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFFALO L. REV. 845, 870
(1997) (stating ProCD database could be used as substitute for long distance information,
a way to look up old friends, or as substitute for local phone book).
32 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449 (explaining that database cost more than $1 million to
compile and was expensive to maintain). See Brian Covotta & Pamela Sergeeff, I
Intellectual Property: A Copyright: 1. Preemption: b) Contract Enforceabiity: ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1998) (noting ProCD licensed database at
lower price for private users than for commercial users); David J. DePippo, Dear Sir or
Madam: You Cannot Contract in a Closet, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 423, 431 (2001) (specifying
"ProCD sold its product to residential, non-commercial users at a much lower price than
to commercial users").
33 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449 (noting that consumer was notified of license's existence on
outside of box, with terms contained in written manual, and that license was also encoded
on disks and appeared whenever software ran). See Mark Andrew Cerny, A Shield
Against Arbitration: U.C. C. § 2-207's Role in the Enforceability ofArbitration Agreements
Included with Delivery of Products, 51 ALA. L. REV. 821, 824 (2000) (stating that ProCD's
license was printed in manual, encoded on CD-ROM disks, and every time software was
run notice appeared that listings are limited to non-commercial use); see also David
Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 61
(1999) (suggesting "one concern about undermining the holding of ProCD is that to do so
exposes valuable databases of uncopyrightable materials to parasitic copying and
undermines efforts to recoup investment costs through price discrimination").
34 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (noting that purpose of lawsuit was to seek injunction
against Zeidenberg). See Cerny, supra note 33, at 824 (stating Zeidenberg violated license
agreement when he sold ProCD's database online through his corporation for less than
2003]
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In finding the shrink-wrap license enforceable, the court
applied the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter "UCC") and
basic contract principles. 35  The court found that "ProCD
proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the
software after having an opportunity to read the license at
leisure."36 Consistent with contract law, Zeidenberg had the
ability to reject the contract by sending back the product after
having read the terms. 37 Zeidenberg's failure to send the product
back after reading the terms indicated his acceptance to the court
and bound him to the terms of the agreement. 38
The ProCD court also discussed market competition as a
safeguard for consumer protection concerning shrink-wrap.
Under this theory, the terms and conditions offered by contract
reflect private ordering and a decision on behalf of consumers
and sellers as to what are the most important and essential
ProCD charged its commercial customers); see also Joseph C. Wang, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg and Article 2B.- Finally, the Validation of Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 439, 445 (1997) (opining that Zeidenberg saw ProCD's
warnings on his computer screen, but did not believe they were binding on him).
35 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (noting that licenses are ordinary contracts accompanying
sale of products and are governed by UCC and common law of contracts); Kell Corrigan
Mercer, Slrink- Wrap Licenses: Consumer Shriak- Wrap Licenses and Public Domain
Materials; Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code Validity in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1287, 1338 (1997) (explaining that Seventh Circuit
judges stated sale of ProCD's database was offer which could only be accepted through
assent to hidden terms, and found Zeidenberg assented when he used the software after
inspecting the terms). But see Brandon L. Grusd, Contracting Beyond Copyright: ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 361 (1997) (recognizing "the U.C.C. is of
little direct help in divining the circumstances under which such contracts are to be
enforced.. .thus to find the answer we must turn to broader considerations of public
policy").
36 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. See Darren C. Baker, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial
Reality, Flexibility in Contract Formation, and Notions of Manifest Assent in the Arena of
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 379, 386 (1997) (noting "under 2-207(2) the
license terms in standard forms such as ProCD's license are proposals for addition to the
contracts which are already solidified"); Mercer, supra note 35, at 1295 (commenting that
although District Court held against ProCD, it acknowledged shrink-wrap licenses could
be viewed as proposals to modify existing contract between the parties).
37 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (asserting that Zeidenberg had no choice because software
would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance). See Hall v. Resolution Trust
Corp, 958 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating "it is quite plain that a party to a contract
can simply reject a nonconforming proposal for modification of the contract"); Ala. Chem.
Co. v. Int'l Agric. Corp., 110 So. 614, 614-16 (Ala. 1926) (noting party may reject and
return product for failure to comply with terms of contract).
38 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (remarking that UCC permits contracts to be made in
different ways). See Baker, supra note 36, at 386 (stating "a panel of the Seventh Circuit
held that shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable, unless their terms are unenforceable under
general contract law"); see also Ala. Chem., 110 So. at 614-16 (noting that electing to
retain or consuming goods created implied contract).
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terms. 39 This prioritizing is essential to the efficient functioning
of markets and reflects the court's traditional separation from
any business judgment decisions.40
Click-wrap
Click-wrap or click-through agreements are basically an
outgrowth of shrink-wrap that have been formatted primarily for
the Internet. 41 This method usually involves the display of the
license on the screen and prompts the user to accept the terms by
clicking "I accept."42 This method of licensing is advantageous
because there are no problematic additional terms and/or UCC 2-
207 problems that sometimes arise with shrink-wrap. 43
39 ProCd, 86 F.3d at 1455, citing American Airlines v. Wolen, 513 U.S. 219, 229-30
(1995) (discussing federal preemption of state remedies and federal statutes designed to
encourage reliance on competitive market forces). See generallyMeurer, supra note 31, at
870 (outlining requirements of maintaining effective price conditions and competitive
market forces); Mark A. Rodwin, Mechanisms of Consumer Protection - The MarketPlace
and Regulation: Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What are the Issues 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 1007, 1020 (1996) (listing market factors that contribute toward
consumer harm, as well as factors needed for markets to work).
40 See American Airlines, 513 U.S. at 230 (noting market efficiency requires
enforceability of private agreements, based on needs and perceptions of contracting
parties); see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455 (noting licenses serve a procompetitive function;
suggesting enforcement of shrink-wrap license may even result in lower prices and more
availability of information); Madison, supra note 1, at 1031 n.21 (explaining that ProCD
court's premise behind "market forces" idea is that market should define boundaries of
fair use and public domain).
41 See Protecting Soft ware and Information on the Internet, supra note 10, at para. 22
(comments of Pamela Samuelson) (explaining that with Internet servers, customers can
be forced to assent to terms of license by clicking an accept button, before they are able to
download programs); see also Chao, supra note 10, at 442 n.36 (asserting that contracts
where website visitor must click on "I accept" button is generally considered click-wrap);
Gregory E. Maggs, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National
Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section VI Regulating
Electronic Commerce, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 665, 672 (2002) (describing click-wrap as "the
Internet user sees the contract terms on the computer screen, and cannot complete the
purchase without clicking a box on the screen to indicate assent").
42 See Keohane, supra note 6, at 445 (explaining popular method of license agreement
for software users); Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Mapractice: Legal Exposure for
Cybermedicine, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 361 n.276 (1999) (describing click-wrap as
"consumers on their computers clicking on a box marked 'I Agree'"). See generally
Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary Aswad, & Joseph S. Cianfrani, How Much
Fuel to Add to the Fire of Genius? Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction
Distinction in Patent Law, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 1205, 1227-28 (1999) (discussing issues
raised by contractual agreements against infringement).
43 The structure of online sales transactions sidesteps the 2-207 issues addressed in
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). Step-
Saver was a pre-ProCD case which held a shrink-wrap license unenforceable after
applying 2-207 to determine if the terms of the agreement were incorporated into the
parties' agreement. After emphasizing that the contract was formed when Step-Saver
placed its order over the telephone and TSL agreed to ship the software, the court found
that the terms contained inside the box were additional terms after the contract was
20031
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Specifically, because the licensee must unequivocally agree to the
terms of the license before he or she is able to download the
product or enter the site, there is no possibility that the terms
will be seen as a proposal for additional terms that would elicit a
2-207 scenario.4 4 However, the terms and conditions on the
webpage are the terms offered, and it would be very difficult for
an individual user to negotiate for different terms without first
accepting the terms and entering the website.45
Case law has upheld click-wrap agreements as enforceable
contracts. In Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc.,46 the court
held that the defendants were bound to the Terms of Service
posted on the website when they clicked "I accept."47 Also, in
Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC,48 a forum selection clause in
Microsoft Network's subscriber agreement was upheld as valid
and enforceable. 49 Another forum selection clause contained in a
formed. Therefore, because the terms of the shrink-wrap substantially altered the
contract, these provisions were not a part of the contract between the parties. Keohane,
supra note 6, at 447-48. Conversely, ProCD held that 2-207 was not problematic because
unlike Step-Saver, a "battle of the forms" case, ProCD had only one form and therefore 2-
207 was irrelevant to its decision. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
44 See Keohane, supra note 6, at 449 (explaining that click-wrap normally avoids
application of U.C.C. 2-207); see also Zachary M. Harrison, Just Click Here: Article 2B's
Failure to Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 907, 912-13 (1998) (suggesting recent rulings
enforcing click-wrap and shrink-wrap licenses illustrate need for U.C.C. provisions
dealing with electronic licensing). But see Ayyappan, supra note 6, at 2472 (suggesting
U.C.C. provisions have been applied inconsistently by courts in software cases).
45 See Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberpace Under E-Sign: "There's
a New Sheriffin Town!", 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 943, 953 (2002) (noting "enforceability of...
click-wrap licenses is being debated because, among other things, there is no opportunity
for the purchaser to negotiate the agreement and the terms are extremely broad and
highly restrictive."); see also Keohane, supra note 6, at 449 (explaining that although
click-wrap normally avoids the Step-Saver analysis and the application of U.C.C. 2-207,
the possibility of previous communications could reintroduce this problem); Spooner,
supra note 7, at *4 (suggesting laws requiring software publishers to negotiate licenses
would result in significant price increases and burdens consumers).
46 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 1998). See Harrison, supra note
44, at 913, 928 (noting importance that outcome of Hotmail decision would have on legal
analysis of click-wrap agreements); Thomas C. Inkel, Comment, Internet-Based Fans:
Why the Entertainment Industries Cannot Depend on Traditional Copyright Protections,
28 PEPP. L.REv. 879, 899 (2001) (clarifying the importance of Hotmailin quickly evolving
jurisprudence of Internet agreements).
47 Hotmail, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at *20 (stating that plaintiffs were enjoined
from sending "spain" email that falsely stated it came from plaintiffs email service and
from using Hotmail accounts as mailboxes for receiving reply spam). See Harrison, supra
note 44, at 913 (stating that court enjoined individual at least partially to enforce
provisions of click-wrap agreement); Inkel, supra note 46, at 899 (elucidating that
"spamming" was enjoined because it violated click-wrap agreement).
48 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. App.Div. 1999).
49 Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532 (refusing to hear case because forum was improper under
forum selection clause within click-wrap agreement). See generally Mark E. Budnitz,
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click-wrap agreement was held enforceable in Groff v. America
Online, Inc.50
Web-wrap
Web-wrap agreements differ significantly from the previously
noted license agreements because of their placement and the way
they are communicated to a user.51  These agreements are
usually displayed on a website's homepage or are accessible
through a link.52 They state what the owner consents to as
acceptable uses of the intellectual property contents on the
website. 53
It is this type of agreement that is at issue in Polistar v.
Gigmania.54 Pollstar provided current concert information on its
website pursuant to the conditions of a license agreement. 55 The
Consumers Suffering for Sales in Cyberspace: What Constitutes Acceptance and What
Legal Terms and Conditions Bind the Consumerg 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 741, 765 (2000)
(indicating that court determined a mouse click to be sufficient assent); Dessent, supra
note 45, at 989-90 (noting click-wrap agreement was valid and therefore forum selection
clause governed).
50 Groff v. America Online, Inc., 1998 WL 307001, at *3 (R.I. Sup.Ct. 1998) (holding
forum selection clause "prima facie valid"). See generally Casainiquela, supra note 8, at
486 n.97 (discussing Groffcourt's validation of click-wrap agreement); Maggs, supra note
41, at 673 n.66 (noting that majority determined that assent was given to click-wrap
agreement).
51 See Chao, supra note 10, at 440 n.7 (asserting that web-wrap agreements are
primarily characterized by their placement); Madison, supra note 1, at 1062 (defining
web-wrap and differentiating varieties of web-wrap agreements).
52 See Chao, supra note 10, at 440 n.7 (claiming these licenses are substantive
agreements merely displayed on a website's home page); see also Madison, supra note 1,
at 1062 (describing how web-wrap agreements work); Michael L. Rustad, Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act: Article Making UCITA More Consumer Friendly,
18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 548 nn.9-10 (1999) (explaining both types of
agreements and differentiating them).
53 See Chao, supra note 10, at 440 n.7 (asserting that web-wrap agreements make
clear what are authorized uses of website information); see also Walter A. Effross, The
Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Websites and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1354 (1997) (explaining that use of content is primary
concern of web-wrap agreements); Madison, supra note 1, at 1062 (stating that web-wrap
agreement is primarily concerned with copyright and trademark rights).
54 170 F.Supp.2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Although Pollstar refers to these as browse
wrap license agreements, I will continue to use the terminology of web-wrap for
consistency and clarity throughout the paper.
55 Pollstar, 170 F.Supp2d at 976 (stating that user could download and use current
concert information pursuant to license agreement). See Maggs, supra note 41, at 673-74
(explaining that concert information was restricted by user agreement that court deemed
enforceable); Jonathan Band, Cyber Rights, Protection, and Markets: Database Cases
Decided During the 106th Congress: Underprotection or Overprotection 32 UWLA L.
REV. 201, 205-06 (2001) (noting that concert information may be protected as "hot news").
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license agreement was characterized as a web-wrap agreement
because the terms were only viewable by clicking on a link from
the homepage. 56 However, beyond making this distinction and
labeling the license, the court refrained from determining the
enforceability of web-wrap agreements. 57
Simultaneous to the decision of Polistar, a United States
District Court for the Central District of California also
contemplated the enforceability of web-wrap agreements. 58 The
defendant in this case, Tickets.com, operated a website which
sold tickets to certain events. 59  However, for events that
Tickets.com did not sell tickets, it provided direct links to
Ticketmaster.com so users could purchase the tickets through
the alternative website.60 Ticketmaster.com's website, however,
subjected its users to a web-wrap agreement that was only
viewable by scrolling down to the bottom of the homepage. 61
56 Pollstar, 170 F.Supp.2d at 981 (stating that this was not shrink-wrap agreement
because shrink-wrap does not allow consumer to continue using product without
acceptance of terms, while under web-wrap, consumer assents to terms by navigating
through websites). See Samuel J. M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, 2000-2001 Survey
of New York Law: Commercial Law, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 289 n.370 (2002)
(indicating that requirement to click on link is court's basis for classifying agreement as
web-wrap); Bradley J. Freedman, Electronic Contracts Under Canadaan Law: A Practical
Guide, 28 MAN. L.J. 1, 30 n.125 (2000) (classifying agreement as web-wrap because it
required clicking onto hyperlink).
57 Pollstar, 170 F. Supp 2d. at 982 (hesitating to make determination concerning
validity and enforceability). See Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer
Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the "Reasonably Communicated" Test, 77
WASH. L. REV. 481, 504 (2002) (noting court's avoidance of enforceability issue); Donnelly
& Donnelly, supra note 56, at 289 n.370 (indicating court's reticence to hold agreement
enforceable).
58 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *3-4. In fact, the Pollstar court
viewed several documents from the Ticketmaster case in connection with the defendant's
motion to dismiss. Pofistar, 170 F.Supp.2d at 976. Although these cases are
contemporaneous, the court in Ticketmaster ruled on the enforceability of web-wrap
agreements and found them to be unenforceable. For further discussion and comparison
of these cases, see Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty
for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1387-88 (2001).
59 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *3-4 (detailing business of
Tickets.com). See Andrew B. Buxbaum & Louis A. Curcio, When You Can't Sell to Your
Customers, Try Selling Your Customers (But Not Under the Bankruptcy Code), 8 AM.
BANKR. INST. L.J. 395, 400-01 (2000) (indicating that Tickets.com sold tickets to limited
number of concerts); Chao, supra note 10, at 441 (noting that Tickets.com provided tickets
for only some concerts).
60 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4553, at *2-3 (describing operations of
website). See Buxbaum & Curcio, supra note 59, at 400-01 (indicating that Tickets.com
was a clearinghouse of concert information that provided links for purchase of tickets);
Chao, supra note 10, at 441 (describing process through which Tickets.com linked users to
sites where its customers could purchase concert tickets).
61 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4553, at *2-3 (stating that user must scroll
down to bottom of homepage to arrive at terms and agreement of usage). See Christian H.
Nadan, Open Source Licensing. Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349, 363
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Ticketmaster claimed that by using the information provided for
commercial uses, Tickets.com violated the agreement. 62
Without clarifying or labeling the agreement at issue, the court
held that this was not a typical shrink-wrap. 63 The court stated
that shrink-wrap agreements are usually "open and obvious" and
hard to miss, which was not the case here because the home page
could be, and was, bypassed by Tickets.com users and was not
immediately apparent to a user upon entering the website.64
Additionally, the court discussed the absence of an "accept"
button as additional evidence that this was not an enforceable
contract, 65 stating that "it cannot be said that merely putting
terms and conditions in this fashion creates a contract with any
one using the website."66  Notably, the court granted the
(2002) (stating that Ticketmaster website contained "terms of use" link at bottom of page).
See generally Effross, supra note 53, at 1352 (discussing similarities between web-wrap
and shrink-wrap agreements).
62 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4553, at *7-8 (stating that Ticketmaster's user
agreement prohibited use of its website for commercial purposes). See Eugene R. Quinn,
Jr., Websurfing 101: The Evolving Law of Hyperlinking, 2 BARRY L.REV. 37, 64 (2001)
(discussing in detail how Tickets.com used Ticketmaster's information for commercial
purposes); Nicos L. Tsilas, Minimizing Potential Liability Associated with Linking and
Framing on the World Wide Web, 8 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 85, 96 (2000) (noting that
Ticketmaster claimed that Tickets.com violated user agreement by using information for
commercial gain).
63 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at 218 (stating that Ticketmaster's user
agreement is not a shrink-wrap license agreement because it was not open and obvious
and did not allow users to click on agreement). See generally Carl W. Chamberlin, To the
Millenium: Emerging Issues for the Year 2000 and Cyberspace, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 131, 170 (1999) (discussing shrink-wraps in detail); Michael J.
Schmelzer, Protecting the Sweat of the Spider's Brow: Current Vulnerabilities of Internet
Search Engines, 3 B.U. J.SCI. TECH. L. 12, para. 70 (discussing how courts have dealt
with shrink-wrap agreements).
64 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (concluding that Tickmaster's user
agreement was not shrink-wrap license agreement). See generally Chamberlin, supra
note 63, at 170 (outlining what constitutes shrink-wrap agreement); Wei Wei Jeang &
Robin A- Brooks, New Intellectual Property, Information Technology, and Security in
Borderless Commerce: Current On-Line Issues, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L.REV. 615, 623 (2002)
(defming elements of shrink-wrap agreements).
65 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (stating that many other websites
make user click to accept button before allowing user to proceed). See generally Trevor
Cox, Information and the Internet: Understanding the Emerging Legal Framework for
Contract and Copyrigut Law and Problems with International Enforcement 11
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 23, 23 (1998) (explaining that "clickwrap" agreements typically have
accept button that users need to click on); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright:
Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L.REv. 569, 571 (1997)
(discussing how shrink-wrap licenses are treated as enforceable contracts).
66 T cketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (stating reason why
Ticketmaster's user agreement does not qualify as enforceable contract). See generally
David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. Needleman, New Intellectual Property, Information
Technology, and Security in Borderless Commerce: Current Status of Copynght
Protection in the Digital Age and Related Topics, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L.REV. 539, 588
(2002) (noting that courts have been reluctant to enforce agreements when there is no
2003]
100 ST JOHN'S JO URNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint should they produce
facts showing Tickets.com's knowledge of the facts as well as an
implied agreement to the terms.67
The most recent court to explore the enforceability of a web-
wrap agreement was in Specht v. Netscape Communications
Corp.68 This case involved Netscape's SmartDownload and the
proper forum for disputes concerning the software.69 Pursuant to
the terms of a web-wrap agreement on its homepage, the
defendant, Netscape Communications, moved to compel
arbitration in its disputes concerning SmartDownload.70 After
evaluating the various types of licensing agreements, the court
held that the agreement at issue was a web-wrap agreement
because it could only be viewed by scrolling down the homepage
of the website7l and there was no affirmative consent necessary
to download the product. 72
indication that visitor was required to at least look at terms and conditions); Simona
Kiritsov, Can Millions of Internet Users Be Breaking the Law Every Day?An Intellectual
Property Analysis of Linking and Framing and the Need for Licensing, 2000 STAN. TECH.
L.REv. 1, 7 (2000) (stating that courts have given little guidance to practitioners
regarding end user agreements).
67 Ticketnaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (granting leave to amend provided
court's conditions were met).
68 150 F.Supp.2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (claiming Specht case is only case to cite to
Pollstar and was decided on July 3, 2001).
69 Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 587 (explaining that plaintiffs alleged their use of
software transmits to defendants private information about user's file transfer activity on
the Internet, thereby affecting electronic surveillance of user's activity in violation of two
federal statutes: Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510, and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §1030). See Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 482
(discussing facts of Specht case); Maggs, supra note 41, at 673 (discussing issue that was
in dispute in Specht).
70 Specht 150 F.Supp.2d at 589 (stating that one of terms and conditions of
agreement was that all disputes arising out of use of SmartDownload would be
arbitrated). See Freedman, supra note 56, at 31 (discussing fact that Netscape sought to
compel arbitration based on software license agreement). See generally Larry E. Ribstein
& Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 EMoRY L.J. 1, 46
(2002) (discussing treatment of arbitration clauses in electronic commerce).
71 Specht 150 F.Supp.2d at 588 (noting that users of website were not required to
scroll down to bottom of web page). See Geist, supra note 58, at 1389 (noting that Specht
court distinguished differences between click-wrap and web-wrap agreements). See
generally Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 475 (discussing various ways software license
agreements are displayed on web pages).
72 Specht 150 F.Supp.2d at 588 (noting that users of Netscape website were not
required to affirmatively click on "I accept" button). See Donnelly & Donnelly, supra note
56, at 289 (stating that Specht court focused on whether there were affirmative acts of
acceptance of Netscape's terms); Geist, supra note 58, at 1389 (stating that Specht court
found agreement to be web-wrap agreement because it merely alerted user of terms).
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WEB-WRAP LICENSE AGREEMENTS DO NOT SATISFY THE CONTRACT
PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL ASSENT.
None of the case law concerning software licensing agreements
has lessened the importance of mutual assent in contract
formation.73 In fact, throughout its comprehensive analysis of
license agreements, the Specht court was quite firm on this
issue.74 The new online medium of these agreements does not
change the fact that they are contracts and therefore must
conform to basic contract principles like mutual assent to be
enforceable. 75
Generally, mutual assent means that there has been a
"meeting of the minds" and that both parties understand what is
meant by the terms of a given agreement.76 If a party's actions
manifested an intention to agree, judged by a standard of
reasonableness, then the real but unexpressed state of the
party's mind is irrelevant.77 Therefore, the party must have
73 See Specht 150 F.Supp.2d at 596 (stating that case law on software licensing has
not eroded importance of assent in contract formation); Donnelly & Donnelly, supra note
56, at 289 (noting that mutual assent was main concern of Specbt court); Geist, supra
note 58, at 1389 (discussing Specht court's focus on mutual assent in web page
agreements).
74 Specl4 150 F.Supp.2d at 596 (stating that mutual assent is bedrock of any
agreement to which law will give force). See Donnelly & Donnelly, supra note 56, at 289
(discussing Specht court's focus on necessity of having opportunity to review and assent to
specific terms); Geist, supra note 58, at 1389 (noting that Specht court's decision turned
on finding of mutual assent).
75 See Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 596 (highlighting that case law on shrink-wrap has
not abolished important contract principles like mutual assent). See generally Steven C.
Bennett, Crafting an Enforceable Click-Wrap Agreemen NYLJ, June 20, 2000, at 1
(outlining creation of enforceable software licensing agreements using contract
principles); Mercer, supra note 35, at 1338-39 (noting importance of applying contract
principles to online licensing agreements).
76 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §3.6, 119 (2d ed. 1990)
(noting that those who followed subjective theory of intent would talk of necessity of
actual assent to agreement and "meeting of the minds," although objective theory is now
applied). See generally Busch v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14724, at *15
(6th Cir. July 18, 2002) (memorializing that current view on mutual assent is judged by
objective view of meeting of the minds); Novak v. Seiko Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
9594, at *9 (9th Cir. May 16, 2002) (explaining that court considers overt acts and conduct
of parties to determine their objective intentions and understandings).
77 FARNSWORTH, supra note 76, at 119 (indicating that any mental assent or decision
to join in contract has no relevance as far as court is concerned). See Bourque v. FDIC, 42
F.3d 704, 708 (1st Cir. 1994) (reiterating modern day established legal principle of
requiring manifestation of objective intent in order to show actual mutual assent); Acme
Inv., Inc. v. Southwest Tractor, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1261, 1269 (D. Neb. 1995) (indicating
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shown through some conduct or action that they intended to be
bound by the terms of the agreement. 78 Web-wrap agreements,
however, do not manifest a meeting of the minds because it is
unclear that the user had actual notice of the terms or even the
existence of an agreement. 79 Additionally, users did not indicate
through any action or conduct their assent of the terms of the
agreement or their willingness to be bound by them.80
It is uncertain whether the user had actual notice of the terms.
In the three web-wrap cases mentioned above, notice of the
terms of the license, or even the existence of the license was
fairly determinative for the courts' decisions. 81
In Polistar, the court illustrated that many visitors to the site
may not be aware of the existence of a license agreement through
that subjective intent of parties is not factored in determining mutual assent between
them).
78 See Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (stating that unless plaintiff
could prove facts showing defendant's knowledge of license terms and implied agreement,
motion to dismiss would be granted). See generally DeNeane v. McDonnell & Co., 1969
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12963, at *3 (D.D.C. June 16, 1969) (concluding that plaintiff would
eventually have to make a sufficient showing of facts in order to proceed with the claim
and survive an early motion to dismiss); Fishman v. Van Schaack & Co., 482 P.2d 990,
991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (ruling that plaintiffs lack of proof of defendant's knowledge that
there was problem with property under disputed contract warranted granting defendant's
motion to dismiss).
79 See Chao, supra note 10, at 439 (stating that web-wrap agreements are displayed
on website's homepage or available through links). See generally Gilffllan v. Union Canal
Co., 109 U.S. 401, 403 (1883) (commenting that even without signification of assent by
party, that party's receipt of actual notice may bind him/her to terms of notice);
Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that party who
continues employment despite change in terms of which she was given actual notice
thereby assents to those terms by choosing to continue such employment, regardless if she
never manifested any express consent).
80 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8
(C.D. Cal. March 27, 2000) (asserting that plaintiff must prove defendant's implied
agreement to terms); see also Dodge Street, LLC v. Livecchi, 32 Fed. Appx. 607, 611 (2d
Cir. 2002) (finding that defendant accepted money in accordance with agreement was
sufficient conduct for court to conclude that there was binding agreement); Magellan Int'l
Corp. v. Handel, 76 F. Supp 2d. 919, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (setting forth that statement or
other conduct by offeree can constitute proof of acceptance).
81 See Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp., 150 F.Supp. 2d 585, 595 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (highlighting absence of affirmative assent in SmartDownload web-wrap terms as
opposed to ProCD shrink-wrap agreement, which required users perform "an affirmative
action unambiguously expressing assent"); Pollstar v. Gigmania, 170 F.Supp. 2d 974, 980-
81 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (deciding that there was lack of mutual assent due to difficulty for any
visitor to pick out license agreement - where license agreement must be found on another
web page); Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (stating that unlike
other websites, Ticketmaster.com did not require clicking "I accept" button before
continuing navigating through sites).
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its description of the license. 82 Not only was the license a link
from the homepage and therefore not immediately apparent to
the user upon entering the website, but the license was also
indicated by small gray text on a gray background which was not
eye-catching or noticeable to a user.83 The court also noted that
the text was not underlined, and thus was not clear to the user
that the text was a link to view the license terms, especially
considering that other similar small text on the page were not
links.8 4 Therefore, notice of the terms was not sufficient.8 5
In Ticketmaster, the web-wrap was not a link from the home
page, but was displayed on the home page. 86 This resolved one of
the visibility problems noted by the Pollstar court, however, this
court noted that the terms are only visible if the customer scrolls
down to the bottom of the homepage. 87 Additionally, the court
82 Polistar, 170 F.Supp.2d at 980-81 (noting that after viewing website, court
determined many site visitors may not have been aware of agreement). Cf Bonny v. The
Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 160 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining that party is charged with
knowledge of language contained in any agreement they execute). But see Beaver v.
Grand Prix Karting Ass'n, 246 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2001) (specifying that where party
has been made aware, and party continues his or her normal routine without objection,
that party is deemed to have waived any objection and consented to notice).
83 Polistar, 170 F.Supp.2d at 980-981 (detailing obscure nature of link to license
agreement). See generally Bennett, supra note 75, at 1 (proposing.that enforceability of
click-wrap agreements will ultimately depend on level of notice to, and proof of assent
from, users and buyers); Roland L. Trope, Protecting Readiness Disclosures, NYLJ, Jan.
19, 1999, at 5 (discussing different types of notice with reference to Internet, including
actual notice and website notice).
84 Pollstar, 170 F.Supp.2d at 981 (explaining how website had chosen to arrange
accessibility of license agreement on their homepage). See generallyT. L. James & Co. v.
Traylor Bros. Inc., 294 F.3d 743, 750 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that absence of indication
that contract terms are ambiguous or vague leads to conclusion that there cannot be
contention against sufficient notice). Cf Judge Keenan, R Tgerswerke AG v. Abex Corp.,
NYLJ, June 26, 2002, at 26 (showing that binding obligation may arise against party
upon clear notice of that obligation - which conversely means that lack of that clear or
actual notice may mean that party does not become bound to obligation).
85 Pollstar, 170 F.Supp.2d at 981 (stating, however, that court was hesitant to declare
unenforceability of web-wrap at that time). See generally Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX,
Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1997) (clarifying that notice must be sufficiently plain
and conspicuous in order to give sufficient notice that is enforceable); Gamma-10 Plastics
v. Am. President Lines, 32 F.3d 1244, 1251 (8th Cir. 1994) (arguing that lack of actual
notice by non-receipt of physical bill of lading is tantamount to insufficient notice of
contract terms, even though bill of lading is generally considered adhesion contract).
86 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *2-3 (describing arrangement of web-
wrap link). Cf Pollstar 170 F.Supp.2d at 981 (detailing common underlining of website
links and describing lack of such underlining in that case), with GTE New Media Servs.
Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F.Supp.2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 1998) (commenting that websites,
such as Netscape, include variety of links that visitors may "click" to select other
websites).
87 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (noting that visitors to this
website had to scroll to bottom to notice license agreement link). See generally Hightower
v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 2001) (charging party with knowledge of
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stated that the license was not similar to a shrink-wrap because
the shrink-wrap agreement is "open and obvious and in fact hard
to miss."8 8 The court claimed that the placement of the terms on
the bottom of the homepage where they could easily be missed by
a user could not necessarily be said to create a contract with
anyone who visits the website.8 9
Similarly, the web-wrap in Specht was visible on the bottom of
the home page along with an "invitation to review." 90 Therefore,
along with the placement problems in Ticketmaster.com, the
court also noted that an "invitation to review" does not clearly
illustrate to a user that they are bound by the following terms.91
While polite, this phrasing fails to convey the true nature of the
words as an agreement and a contract. 92 Additionally, one of the
plaintiffs did not download the product through the home page
but through a website managed by a third party and therefore
contract terms although there was no overt act to indicate assent; court determined her
choice to continue to work, after receiving actual notice that her employment contract
would be modified, was tantamount to assenting by omission).
88 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (detailing open and obvious
nature of what is generally known as "shrink-wrap"). See generally Adobe Sys. V.
Stargate Software, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322, at *2 (N.D. Cal. August 20, 2002)
(conveying Adobe's claim that all their products are distributed with shrink-wrap End
User License Agreements); Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp., 150 F. Supp 2d.
585, 588 (S.D.N.Y. August 20, 2001) (indicating that shrink-wrap agreements have been
focus of "considerable litigation").
89 Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (highlighting fact that visitors are
more likely to miss license agreements because they are on same page as more interesting
information). See generally Busch v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., Dyno Nobel, Inc., 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14724, at *15 (6th Cir. July 18, 2002) (reiterating that objective mutual assent or
meeting of the minds must occur to give rise to contract); Novak v. Seiko Corp., 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 9594, at *9 (9th Cir. May 16, 2002) (clarifying that objective mutual assent or
meeting of the minds must occur to give rise to contract).
90 Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 588 (explaining how access to license agreement was
arranged on website). Cf Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (indicating
that "many websites make you click on 'agree' to the terms and conditions"); Pollstar, 170
F.Supp.2d at 981 (informing reader of differences in shrinkwrap and browse wrap
licenses).
91 See Softman Prod. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 1075, 1087 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (stating that installation is required in order for consumer to assent to licensing
agreement); Specbt, 150 F.Supp.2d at 588 (finding "please review" language as
"invitation" to review). See generally Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 476 (noting reluctance
of courts to find mutual assent regarding online license agreements).
92 See Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 588 (stating that visitors are not required to
affirmatively consent). See generally Audio Visual Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 210
F.3d 254, 258-59 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing requirement of mutual assent to form binding
contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §19.2 (1981) (asserting "[T]he conduct of a
party is not effective as a manifestation of assent unless he intends to engage in the
conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct
that he assents").
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never visited the homepage. 93 Both of these considerations led
the court to hold the web-wrap unenforceable and invalid. 94
There was no conduct to suggest acceptance
While in a traditional contract the parties would have a
written document and a signature to establish acceptance of the
terms, the online medium makes acceptance more difficult to
prove. 95 However, there are ways to prove acceptance of terms
including the "I accept" buttons utilized by click-wrap
agreements. 96 Not one of the web-wrap agreements in the three
cases noted above had an "I accept" button or any other way for
the user to show his or her assent to the terms of the agreement
by his or her conduct. This was fairly determinative in the
courts' analysis that the license agreements were not
enforceable.97 In Specht, the court noted that the case law on
software licensing has not "eroded the importance of mutual
assent in contract formation."98 The court pointed to mutual
assent as the "bedrock" of any agreement to which the law will
give force and noted that holding these particular web-wraps
93 See Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 596-97 (explaining that Michael Fagan had obtained
SmartDownload from shareware website which did not contain any reference to license
agreement or its terms).
94 Id. at 598 (asserting denial of defendant's motion to compel arbitration).
95 See Daniela Ivascanu, Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce in the Western
Hemisphere, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 229 (2000) (noting need for uniform system
of digital signatures to effectuate acceptance of digital contracts); Kalama M. Lui-Kwan,
Digital Signatures: Recent Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and Electronic
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 463, 468-69 (1999) (noting how digital signatures can
serve as affirmative acceptance of online contracts). See generally SpechA 150 F.Supp.2d
at 587 (affirming that formality is not required and that any sign or action can create
contract).
96 See Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 587 (stating that "assent may be registered by a
signature, a handshake, or a click of a computer mouse transmitted across the invisible
ether of the Internet"); see also Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10729, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 1998) (finding that user of Internet email
service accepted terms by agreeing to terms of service online and was therefore liable for
breach); Harrison, supra note 44, at 944 (suggesting consumers could assent to contract
terms by affirmatively typing, "I assent to the license terms").
97 See Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 595-96 (asserting that downloading is not clear
indication of assent and without this consent users are not compelled to arbitrate);
Pollstar v. Gigimania, 170 F.Supp. 2d 974, 980-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that the
consumer did not have to click "accept" button before proceeding into website which made
agreement different than normally enforceable shrink-wrap agreements); Ticketmaster
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *8 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2000)
(stating that while many websites necessitate the user to click an "agree" button, the
Ticketmaster agreement did not and that merely placing terms and conditions on a web
page does not create a contract).
98 Specht 150 F.Supp.2d at 596.
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enforceable would "expand the definition of assent as to render it
meaningless."99
MARKET PROTECTION IS NO PROTECTION
In ProCD, market efficiency was an important factor in
declaring shrink-wrap enforceable.10o The market relies on
contract terms and conditions to prioritize what is important to
consumers and producers.101 These terms are then self-regulated
through competition where the producers compete amongst each
other for terms and prices that consumers find desirable1e 2 It is
this competitive aspect that supposedly protects consumers.1 03
Proponents of shrink-wrap often point to the consumer boycott of
the 1980's as suggestive that the market can regulate itself.104
99 Id.
100 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
courts usually enforce preemption clauses for intellectual property but leave private
contracts unaffected); G.M. Hunsucker, The European Database Directive: Regional
Stepping Stone to an International Model?, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
697, 719 (1997) (discussing how some "commercially minded courts" want to ensure
market efficiency). See generally Adam White Scoville, Clear Signatures, Obscure Signs,
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 364 (1999) (opining that increased market efficiency
could result from legislation creating more secure system of electronic commerce).
101 See American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1995) (stating that in order
for market to be efficient, private agreements between parties must be enforceable); see
also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455 (stating that prioritizing of contract terms is important for
efficient market); Raymond Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract
and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 847 (1998) (suggesting that
by controlling terms of contracts that are enforceable parties can achieve efficiency).
102 See William Bratton, The 'Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical appraisal,
74 CORNELL L.REV. 407, 417 (1989) (discussing theory that intense competition leads to
"optimal contracting strategies"). But see Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker in
Cyberspace: A Powerful Model, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 859, 868 (2002) (theorizing that too
much competition in marketplace can lead to collapse of "market structure" and there will
be no consumers). See generally Llewellyn Gibbons, No Regulation, Government
Regulation, or Self Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance
in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 475, 529-30 (1997) (applying theory that
market competition will keep contract terms competitive for consumers to Internet
Service Provider market).
103 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455 (suggesting enforcement of license actually keeps
costs lower for all consumers of product); see also Julian Epstein, The Other Side of
Harmony: Can Trade and Competition Laws Work Together in the International
Marketplace 17 AM. U. INT'L L.REv. 343, 345 (2002) (noting importance of antitrust laws
in protecting competition , which in turn protects consumer interests); Madison, supra
note 1, at 1031 n.21 (stating that ProCD asserts that limitations upon licensing should be
limited only by market forces).
104 See Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management'; 97 MICH. L.REV. 462, 523 (1998) (discussing power of consumers to
boycott, which led software companies to abandon copy protection for their software); see
also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Contract & Code: What Will Remain of Pubhc
Domain, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 87 (2000) (noting consumer boycott that prevented
"copy protected software"); Paul Carroll, On Your Honor Sotware Fims Remove Copy
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However, market competition among vendors is not a sufficient
protection for web-wrap agreements because they are adhesion
contracts1 05 and standard form contracts. 106
Adhesion contracts
Web-wrap agreements are pure adhesion contracts.107 There is
little ability to negotiate for terms, 08 the form is standard, and
the contract is either to be accepted or rejected as a whole.' 09
Protection Devices, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1986, at Sec. 1, pg. 33 (explaining boycott and
its effects on software industry).
105 See Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)
(defining contract of adhesion as "standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by
the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it"); see also Friedrich Kessler, Conracts of
Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.REV. 629, 631 (1943)
(discussing "standardized mass contract" as adhesion contract); Joseph T. McLaughlin,
Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 922 (1996)
(noting that form contracts signed by consumer are usually adhesion contracts).
106 The market for works on the Internet is mainly governed by standardized form
contracts without leaving a consumer the opportunity to negotiate the terms. An
interesting example is the e-Book version of Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland,
published by Volume One for the Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader, with the following use
restrictions attached:
Copy: No text selections can be copied from this book to the clipboard.
Print: No printing is permitted on this book.
Lend: This book cannot be lent to someone else.
Give: This book cannot be given to someone else.
Read Aloud: This book cannot be read aloud.
John R. Therien, Comment, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward
Preserving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the DigitalAge, 16 BERKLEY TECH L.J.
979, 1031 n.268. Software manufacturers use mainly the same type of licensing
agreement. Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed Software: The Legality ofForum License
Agreements, 48 LA. L.REV. 87, 87 (1987). It has been stated that shrink-wrap and web-
wrap contracts are standard form contracts for the information age. Rustad, supra note
52, at 280.
107 See Keohane, supra note 6, at 443-44. See generally Profl. Software Consultants
v. Hill, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12586, *24 (D. Kan. August 30, 1994) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary definition of adhesion contracts); Garry L. Founds, Shrink- Wrap and Click-
Wrap Agreements: 2B Or Not 2B, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 100 (1999) (stating that one
problem with software licenses is that public is unable to negotiate terms of agreement).
108 This is especially apparent when the immediate supplier that the user may have
the ability to contact may not have any control over the terms. By lengthening the
contact chain, the user's ability to negotiate with the producer who actually wrote the
terms of the license is diminished. Noriko Kawawa, Contract Liability for Defects in
Information in Electronic Form, 8 U. BAIT. INTELL. PROP. J. 69, 91 (1999). However, the
problem with asserting that software licenses are adhesion contracts is that contracts of
adhesion are usually enforced as an implied agreement between the parties. Founds,
supra note 107, at 107. Nevertheless, courts have generally refused to recognize terms of
software licenses that were not reviewable by the purchaser until after the item was paid
for, because the terms were not part of the bargained for exchange. Thomas Finkelstein &
Douglas C. Wyatt, Shrinkwrap Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST.
JOHN'S L.REv. 839, 841(1997).
109 While standard form contracts have been upheld, there are several ways that
courts have fashioned to help consumers get out of them: if the writing was not of a type
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Similarly, traditional shrink-wrap holds that an individual who
simply continues to use the product and does not send it back
after reading the contained license agreement is bound by the
terms of it.I10
The usual consumer protection concerns of adhesion contracts
are also apparent when discussing web-wrap agreements.
Because of the nature of the relationship between the parties
over the Internet, deliberation is usually pointless."' It is often
hard to even contact a licensor, let alone enter into
negotiations.11 2 Therefore, licensees cannot negotiate for better
terms, nor do they usually have the resources or interest to do
so. 11 3 Web-wrap agreements then pose the additional problem
that users may not be aware of the terms of a web-wrap
agreement or that they even exist, therefore the negotiations
concern is heightened because without knowledge of a contract,
there cannot be negotiations.11 4
that would reasonably appear to the recipient to contain the terms of a proposed contract,
or if the writing had plainly been an offer, if the term was not one that a reader ought
reasonably to have understood to be part of that offer, or interpreting the language of the
term to favor that party with unequal bargaining power. See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 76. It is generally accepted that courts may place upon adhesion contracts
some limitations, such as construction against the drafter and not enforcing
unconscionable terms or terms that are against public policy. Founds, supra note 107, at
108. Additionally, UCC Section 2B-208(b)(1) will not enforce mass-market terms so
unexpected that "an ordinary reasonable person" would refuse a license with the term.
Rustad, supra note 52, at 284.
110 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
consumers could reject shrink-wrap terms by sending software back under UCC 2-606).
But see Madison, supra note 1, at 1118 n.389 (suggesting that consumers, due to lack of
information, time and desire do not fight legal battles); Finkelstein & Wyatt, supra note
108, at 840 (noting that complicated legalese of license agreements may leave consumers
unsure of what agreements even mean).
111 The theory of form contracts is that as long as enough consumers search for
advantageous terms, all standard forms must offer them. However, this does not play out
in practice because many consumers will not deliberate on any given standard form
contract. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract 47
STANFoRD L. REV. 211, 243-244 (1995).
112 See Madison supra note 1, at 1118 n.389 (highlighting low odds that individuals
subject to unconscionable contract terms will have resources or interest in litigating
claims); see also Founds supra note 107, at 108. But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp 2d. 1332, 1339-42 (suggesting that UCC §2-207 may apply to a scenario similar to
this, in which case additional negotiation would not be necessary and any terms found
within the license may be deemed merely proposals.).
113 Madison, supra note 1, at 1118 n.389. Often consumers will sign these standard
agreements without negotiating or even reading any of the specific terms. These
consumers do not have the full information and are therefore operating under unequal
bargaining power. Consumer protections have been drafted by state legislatures.
McLaughlin, supra note 105, 922. See Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed Software: The
Legality of the Forum License Agreement, 48 LA. L. REV. 87, 126 (1987).
114 Web-wrap agreements do not provide individuals with the ability to amend terms
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Form contracts
Additionally, web-wrap agreements are form contracts because
they are drafted for widespread use with preprinted terms.115
The repeated use of the contract makes it advantageous for the
producers to draft a form that will not only be to their advantage,
but preferably not appear so on its face in order to fool
consumers. 116 This unequal bargaining power contravenes any
market protections that may be available. 17
Richard Posner, however, seems to believe that there is still an
element of market competition to protect consumers.118 Market
or individually negotiate with the other party. See George C.C. Chen, A Cyberspace
Perspective on Governance, Overnance, Standards, and Control: Electronic Commerce on
the Internet: Legal Developments in Taiwan, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 77,
96 (1997). Eisenberg makes an interesting example of banks competing for checking
account users. Consumers are likely to focus on interest rates and activity charges when
opening an account. Therefore, banks compete for these terms with each other. However,
in order to remain profitable, banks will make other terms that consumers are less likely
to search for, i.e. overdrawing penalties, or failing to detect and promptly report an error
in a statement, less favorable to the consumer and weigh them in their favor. Eisenberg,
supra note 111, at 244. Additionally, it is naive to believe the freedom of contract will
prevail and that both parties have equal bargaining power, especially considering the
number of non-profit institutions that deal with these standard licenses which are drafted
by information providers with more resources and interest in the repercussions of the
terms. Rodney J. Petersen, Testimony before The Library of Congress, The United States
Copyright Office, and the Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, Inquiry Regarding Sections 109 and 107 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (Aug.4, 2000) available at
http://www.loc.gov/copyright'reports/studies/dmca/dmca-executive.html.
115 See Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 243 (noting that a form contract is a high
volume repeat transaction); see also Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form
Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 594 (1990)
(explaining "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude of these contracts because consumer is presented
with preprinted forms outlining obligations of both parties); Edith Resnick Warkentime,
Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and Merchant/Consumers
Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 41 (1996) (asserting consumers
often must buy goods on "take-it-or-leave-it" basis).
116 See Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 243 (stating that repeated use of form contracts
makes it advantageous to spend time and money on attorneys and deliberate over terms
of agreements); see also Kemp, supra note 107, at 91-92 (alluding that software
companies use these form contracts as one way to solidify their legal rights); Michael L.
Rustad, The Uniform Commercial Code Proposed Article 2B Symposium: Commercial
Law Infrastructure for the Age of Information, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L.
255, 281 (noting that primary reason that software manufacturers use form contracts is to
limit amount of negotiations and thus reduce transaction costs).
117 See generally Eisenberg supra note 111, at 243 (outlining unequal bargaining
power and "asymmetrical incentives" of parties to form contracts); Stephen J. Ware,
Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461,
1476 n.70 (1989) (outlining source that courts use when expounding that form contracts
are used primarily by those with strong bargaining power). But see Founds, supra note
107, at 107 (arguing that standard form contracts used in software licensing agreements
may be advantageous to both the manufacturer and the consumer).
118 See Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the
Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 299 (1998) (explaining
2003]
110 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
competition theory states that if one firm offers an unfavorable
term in their standard form contract, consumers will refuse to
bargain with that firm." 9 Posner claims that this selectivity by
consumers can help obliterate unreasonable and unconscionable
contract terms even if only a minority of consumers actually read
the terms and refuse to bargain.120 Under this theory, market
pressures can remove the need for any review and protections
against unconscionable terms. 121
Along with Posner, other proponents of the market competition
approach point to consumer boycotts as an effective safeguard.122
Clearly, markets are regulated by price and because market price
is what the consumer is willing to pay for a particular item in the
marketplace, the community of users is at a particular advantage
to influence the terms of computer transactions.123 Boycotting
Posner's perspective that competition in the markets renders issues of monopoly power
moot); Harry Steinberg, Note, Ohgopol'stic Interdependence: The FTC Adopts a 'No
Agreement" Standard to Attack Parallel Non-Collusive Practices, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV.
255, 257 n.1 (1984) (highlighting Posner's view that competition is "the natural state of
affairs" and it "always benefits consumers"). See generally Michael H. Orbison, Note,
Vertical Restraints in the Brewing Industry Is the Malt Beverage Interbrand
Competition Act the Answer, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 143, 164 n.113 (explaining how
monopoly theory works with consumer protection).
119 See Ostas, supra note 118, at 214-15(defming Posner's market competition
argument in contracts); see also Meyerson, supra note 115, at 595 (arguing consumers in
disagreement with form contracts may look elsewhere or not purchase product); Nimmer,
supra note 101, at 847 (highlighting that outside consumer markets, purchasers' choices
influence changes in form contracts).
120 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Economic Theory, 88 CALIF. L.REV. 395, 438 (2000) (noting efficient markets only
require some consumers to be well informed); Ostas, supra note 118, at 229 (arguing that
market pressures can eradicate unreasonable contract terms). But see Jean Braucher,
Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission,
68 B.U. L.REV. 349, 361 (1988) (explaining that even if consumers fully understood terms
in form contracts, they still could not bargain because employees of companies do not have
power to change terms).
121 See Nimmer, supra note 101, at 847 (opining that "if enough potential purchasers
decline the product and terms, the provider will change the price or terms, or leave the
market"); Ostas, supra note 118, at 228-29 (noting that rise of Internet companies that
tout intellectual property as their key asset will make competitors feel market pressure to
offer more favorable terms in standard contracts). But see Frank P. Darr,
Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1832 (1994) (arguing that
courts have nonetheless resorted to doctrine of unconscionabiity to enforce "some norms
of community justice").
122 See Hugenholtz, supra note 104, at 87 (noting that consumer boycott of copy-
protected software in 1980's was effective measure); see also Major R. Ken Pippin,
Consumer Privacy on the Internet: It's Surfer Beware, 47 A.F. L.REV. 125, 138 (1999)
(explaining how Intel modified Intel Pentium chip III in response to threatened consumer
boycott); Deborah Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract
Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L.REV. 1205, 1220 n.45 (2000) (noting
existence of body of work on "consumer resistance strategies").
123 See Jason Green, Is Zippo's Sliding Scale a Slippery Slope of Uncertainty? A Case
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the products of an egregiously unfair company is an effective
mechanism to induce change.124 In particular, one scholar has
noted the successful consumer boycott of the early 1980's and it's
effect on copy-protected software.125
This theory is widely criticized.126  Dealings between
merchants may have this protection because both parties have
equal bargaining power, however, consumers sitting at their
home computers do not have the same bargaining position.127
This structure is problematic because consumers without
sufficient resources or the necessary business sophistication are
unable to effectively go after dishonest sellers.128
Even more problematic is that the seller may be beyond the
for Abolishing Website Interactivity as a Conclusive Factor in Assessing Minimum
Contacts in Cyperspace, 34 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 1051, 1052-53 (2001) (noting that
consumers in computer transactions have a broad reach in "global market"); Thomas J.
Murphy, It's Just Another Little Bit of History Repeating- UCITA in an Evolving Age of
Information, 30 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 559, 587 (arguing consumers purchasing
products on the web may influence market). See generally Darr, supra note 121, at 1838
(discussing market price as determinative of consumer behavior).
124 See, e.g., Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform -
ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing or a Reinvention Tool, 37 AM. Bus. L J. 35, 41 n.35
(1999) (arguing consumer boycott of tuna led seafood processors to purchase tuna that
was only caught in dolphin safety nets). But see Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 243-44
(stating that many consumers will not deliberate on contract terms); Madison, supra note
1, at 1118 n.389 (stating that scant resources and ability make it unlikely consumers will
litigate against unconscionable contract terms).
125 See Hugenholtz, supra note 104, at 96 (discussing effectiveness of consumer
boycott against copy-protected software); see also Richard D. Haroch, Legal Issues
Associated with the Creation and Operation of Websites, 537, 584 (2000) (stating
threatened consumer boycotts forced Intel to modify its Pentium chip); Pippin, supra note
122, at 138 (discussing modification of Intel Pentium chip in response to consumer
pressures).
126 See Gail E. Evans, Opportunity Costs of Globahzing Information Licenses:
Embedding Consumer Rights within the Legislative Framework for Information
Contracts, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J., 267, 291 (1999) (arguing
"cyber-market" corporations have greater power over consumers because they possess
more information); Nimmer, supra note 101, at 847 (characterizing this view as
"romantic" theory). See generally Daniel E. Wenner, Renting in Collegetown, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 543, 569.
127 See Goodman, supra note 8, at 324 (arguing daily computer transactions consist of
unequal bargaining power and standard form contracts involved in purchasing software
are contracts of adhesion). See generally Budnitz, supra note 49, at 751 (noting that
online shopping takes place under different circumstances than shopping in person);
Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions ofLaw, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1910
(2000) (discussing how standard form contracts lead to loss in consumer bargaining power
because they are not symmetrical).
128 See Evans, supra note 126, at 291 (discussing advantage of online corporations
over purchasers because they possess more information); see also Lary Lawrence, Toward
a More Efficient and Just Economy- An Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer
Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 817 (1998) (stating that many consumers lack
information or knowledge about how to use information); Madison, supra note 1, at 1118
n.389 (stating that scant resources and ability make it unlikely consumers will litigate
against unconscionable contract terms).
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reach of an effective remedy 29 Refusal of payment is often a
consumer's most effective weapon against unfair bargaining.130
Without payment, a company has the choice to either institute a
breach of contract action in which the substantive terms of the
contract may be reviewed by a court and may be found invalid, or
even more to the consumer's advantage, the company may simply
decide not to pursue payment if the cost exceeds the benefit. 31
However, with web-wrap agreements, the user has little ability
to negotiate for these rights and payment is usually not
involved.132 Therefore, he has no effective weapon and must
comply with the terms of a contract he is unhappy with, or face a
lawsuit. 133
129 See Elwin Griffith, Searching for the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some
Problems in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L.REV. 265, 313 n.284
(2000) (noting that consumer cannot assert seller's breach of warranty or failure to
perform when he has contracted out of these rights); see also Founds, supra note 107, at
107 (stating that contracts of adhesion are usually enforced as implied agreements
between the parties); Rubin, supra note 127, at 1909 (suggesting inherent unfairness in
these types of transactions).
130 Griffith, supra note 129, at 313 n.284 (citing nonpayment as most effective tool in
fight against seller). See generally Rebecca Korsec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict
Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L.REV. 227, 239 (1997) (noting consumers will not pay in failure to warn and
defective marketing cases if warnings are "overly detailed"); Symposium, Copyrights in
Cyberspace -Rights Without Laws? 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1168 (1998) (noting that
consumers may express preferences for products through market transactions).
131 Griffith, supra note 129, at 342-43 (noting that consumers can also be subject to
recission or damages); see also John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction
Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 295-96 (2000) (explaining judges will "invalidate
standardized terms they do not like"); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme
Court, 81 CALIF. L.REV. 431, 439 (1993) (suggesting that courts will adopt public policy
doctrine in deciding whether or not to enforce terms of contracts). See generally Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw.
U.L. REV. 749, 755 (2000).
132 Griffith, supra note 129, at 266-67 (describing intent of Truth in Lending Act, to
increase rights of consumers). See generally Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 475-77
(describing characteristics of click-wrap and browser wrap agreements); Dawn Davidson,
Click and Commit: What Terms are Users Bound to When They Enter Websites, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2000) (explaining how web-wrap agreements are different
than shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements because they do not involve sale of goods
but passive user involvement).
133 See Griffith, supra note 129 at 313 n.284 (arguing that without claims for breach
of warranty or failure to perform under contract the seller's weapon of non-payment is
lost); see also Madison, supra note 1, at 1060 (observing that web-wrap agreements
require user to comply with all terms including enforcement of payment); Rustad, supra
note 52, at 548-49 n.10 (noting that many web-wrap agreements do not deal with
payment terms because they are licenses for use of material on particular websites).
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WEB-WRAP AGREEMENTS CAN RESTRICT MORE THAN NORMAL
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright law is important because of its role in encouraging
creativity, the promotion of learning and its protection of the
public domain. 34 It is even constitutionally mandated in Article
I, §8, clause 8,135 due somewhat to the precarious balance it
maintains with the First Amendment and free speech.136 To some
extent the copyright clause was intended as a vehicle for free
speech because it promotes public access to knowledge by
providing an economic incentive to authors to publish books and
disseminate ideas to the public.137 This balance is precarious,
however, so certain First Amendment principles have been built
into copyright law including the doctrine of fair use.1 38
134 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001) (affirming that primary
purpose of copyright is to give to public labors of author); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (reciting that goal of copyright is to stimulate
creation and publication of intellectual material); Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Corp., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that three main goals of copyright
law were codified from English Statute of Anne, and are promotion of learning, protection
of public domain, and granting of exclusive right to author).
135 See U.S. CONST. art. I §8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have the power.. .to promote the
progress of science... by securing for limited time to authors.. .the exclusive right to their
respective writings.").
See generally Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 151 (1998) (stating that Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 was enacted to promote useful arts by
rewarding creativity of authors); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 94 (1996)
(remarking that Congress can legislate to promote progress of science and arts by
granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors pursuant to Art. I, §8, cl. 8).
136 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Board v. College Savings. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 649-50 (1999) (quoting Justice Story's commentary on Federal Constitution
as saying that allowing public full enjoyment and possession of authors' works without
restraint is power delegated to national government); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (noting that District Courts have rejected
First Amendment challenges to federal copyright law); Sun Trust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1261
(asserting that copyright clause was intended to be engine of free expression).
137 See Sun Trust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1261 (maintaining that economic incentive for
authors cultivates distribution of ideas to public); see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong.
Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 816 (5th Cir. 2002) (positing that elimination of economic
incentive of copyright would seriously impair many not-for-profit companies that rely on
monies from copyright royalties as income); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co.,
158 F.3d 674, 682 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1998) (noting that financial incentives are essential to
copyrights on compilation works).
138 See Sun Trust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1264 (explaining that First Amendment
principles of doctrine of fair use and idea/expression dichotomy are built into copyright so
courts do not have to address related First Amendment arguments in copyright cases). Cf
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2nd Cir. 2001) (noting that
Supreme Court has never held that fair use was constitutionally required) with Iowa
State Univ. Research Found. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2nd Cir. 1980) (suggesting that
judicially-created fair use doctrine permits courts to avoid rigid application of copyright
law which may stifle creativity).
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Additionally, copyright law has other safeguards like the first-
sale doctrine 139 and certain copying exceptions for libraries that
also preserve the promotion of learning and ideas drafted into the
Constitution. 140 However, with license agreements, information
providers can contractually subject a user to restrictions that go
further than copyright law prescribes and therefore infringe the
safeguards and protections that copyright law offers.141
These agreements have the potential to limit fair use.
While it is only more recently in the 1976 Act that the fair use
doctrine was statutorily recognized, 142 even as early as English
common law, judges and courts have recognized that sometimes
the unconsented to use of one author's work by a subsequent
author may be a "fair abridgement" based on the fact that the
second author had created a new, original work that would itself
139 Under the first sale doctrine, once the work is sold or legally transferred, the
copyright owner's interest in the material object is exhausted. LEAFFER, supra note 2, at §
8.14. There is also an understanding among consumers that some photocopying of books
is permissible as long as there is no personal financial reward. Schools and students are
especially apt to take advantage of this understanding. Madison, supra note 1, at 1084.
For an explanation of the first sale doctrine as a limitation on the exclusive rights of
distribution given to authors, see Donna K Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods with
Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1994).
140 See 17 U.S.C § 108 (1994) (providing libraries and archives can reproduce one copy
or phonorecord of work as long as there is no commercial advantage); see also Universal
City Studios, Inc., 273 F.3d at 441 (noting that Digital Millennium Copyright Act contains
exceptions for libraries and schools to test software); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting three exceptions in the Copyright Act for
archival copying).
141 See COMMENTS OF THE LIBRARY ASSOCIATIONS, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
INQUIRY REGARDING SECTIONS 109 AND 107 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
(Aug. 4, 2000) available at http://www.arl.org/info/letters/dmca_80400.html (expressing
concerns including restriction of Interlibrary Lending capabilities, less archiving ability
and private donations); see also Eric Douma, The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act and the Issue of Preemption of Contractual Provisions Prohibiting
Reverse Engineering, Disassembly, and Decompilation, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 249,
281 (2001) (suggesting that licensing agreements may limit each party's rights under fair
use doctrine); Karen E. Georgenson, Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Software: Fair
Use or Misuse9 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 291, 316 (1996) (noting that anti-competition
clauses in licensing agreements are contrary to goals of copyright law).
142 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codification of judicially-created fair use doctrine); see
also HARRY G. HENN, HENN ON COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, 223 (3d ed.
1991) (discussing fair use doctrine). See generally Jon R. Mostel, Comment, The Home
Videotaping Controversy: Fair Use or Fair Game? Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of America, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 363, 397-98 (1983) (arguing that Legislature
intended fair use to mean reasonable use when incorporating it into statute).
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promote the progress of science and thereby benefit the public.143
However, this doctrine of fair use that evolved for the public's
benefit may be sidestepped by web-wrap agreements.144 A
licenser could prevent a user from copying the work for private
purposes, quoting from the work, and making copies for
educational or scientific purposes, all of which would normally
have been acceptable fair uses of material. 145 Additionally,
uploading material that would under normal circumstances, and
in any other medium, be excused by the fair use doctrine would
continue to be privileged.146
Libraries are adversely affected by these license agreements.
Libraries are facing problems with license agreements.147 As
143 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)
(explaining that verbatim copying by subsequent authors without originality is
infringement if not done under fair use); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE
PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C. 1995)
(1985) (discussing concept of "fair abridgment"). But see BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g. Corp.
v. Donnelly Info. Publ'g., 999 F.2d 1436, 1444 n.18 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting different
application of fair use with respect to subsequent authors of fictional and non-fictional
works).
144 See Madison, supra note 1, at 1109 (asserting "[n]otwithstanding the fact that
ProCD concerned shrink-wrap applied to public domain material and technically
concerned the elements of an enforceable license, its reasoning has been extended to
contexts involving copyrighted material and the assertion of so-called "proprietary
rights""); see also Rustad, supra note 52, at 561 n.110 (expressing concern that under
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act publishers may try to limit writers' and
librarians' rights under fair use doctrine). But see Effross, supra note 53, at 77 (arguing
that inconspicuousness of or reluctance to implement terms of web-wrap agreements may
render them unenforceable).
145 See Hugenholtz, supra note 104, at 79 (reasoning that contract law will govern
relationships between information providers and end-users on Internet which may result
in consumers giving up contractual freedoms they otherwise would have had); Madison,
supra note 1, at 1143 (stating that "the lesson" of ProCD is that publishers can not only
avoid copyright law, but they can define scope of legitimate debates about what society
values in access to and use of information.). But see Douma, supra note 141, at 260
(arguing that fair use is already set of implied promises even without contractual
provisions contained within license).
146 See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHi.-KENT
L.REV. 1203, 1225 (1998) (suggesting that uploading short excerpts of material to be
subject to criticism would still be privileged under fair use); see also Bruce R. Poquette,
Current Public Law and Pohcy Issues : Information Wants to be Free, 22 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 175, 196 (2000) (explaining that uploading of material onto Internet for
commercial purpose will not be privileged under fair use). See generally Laura G. Lape, A
Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State ofJoint Work Doctrine, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 43, 78 (1997) (summarizing recent decisions regarding uploading of information
and copyright ramifications).
147 See generally COMMENTS OF THE LIBRARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 141 (outlining
concerns of libraries regarding licensing agreements); Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict
in the Digital Environment: Librarians Versus Copyright Holders, 24 COLuM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 115, 119-20 (2000) (discussing potential for free use of copyrighted works by
2003]
116 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:87
one of the nation's largest volume-purchasers of copyrighted
works, any significant changes affecting either price or access can
have direct and indirect adverse affects on them and their
users. 148 Under section 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the
reproduction or distribution of a copy or a phonorecord by a
library is not an infringement of a copyright if it is a fair use or
for archiving purposes.149 Therefore, library patrons have always
had the right to enter the libraries' facilities, access works
lawfully owned by the library, and use those works, often
anonymously, as allowed by copyright laws and copy them for
private purposes.150  Copyright law has never meant that
libraries); Georgia K Harper, The University Community Pursuit of the Promise of the
New Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 463 (1993) (suggesting that specifically
tailored license agreements may be more advantageous than subscriptions which are
usually more than libraries can afford).
148 According to surveys published in 1998 by the National Center for Education
Statistics, the 8,891 U.S. public library systems alone spent $789 million on library
materials, including electronic formats in 1995. The 3,303 U.S. academic libraries spent
$1.3 billion on information resources in all formats in 1994. These libraries now spend
over $2 billion. Comments of Library Associations, supra note 141. Academic libraries
devote 85% of their budgets to hard copies of materials. Proceedings of the 94th Annual
Meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries Held in Minneapo's, Minnesota
July 14-19, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 627, 641 (2001). Libraries, as the largest purchasers of
information in the country, are particularly sensitive to changing costs in information
because they cannot easily pass these costs on to the patrons. Deborah Reilly, The
National Information Infrastructure and Copyright: Intersections and Tensions, 76 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 903, 924 (1994).
149 See Henn, supra note 142, at 249 (outlining rule on reproduction or distribution by
libraries); see also Christine L. Wettach, What Constitutes Fair Use of Medical, Scientific
and Technical Writings with Respect to Copyright Infringement Actions, 144 A.L.R. FED.
537, 537 (1998) (stating that doctrine of fair use operates as defense to any claim of
copyright infringement). See generallyLape, supra note 146, at 678 (stating that fair use
doctrine is justified because this type of unauthorized used of copyrighted information
outweighs any disincentive to create new works).
150 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement of copyright for a library or
archives, or any of its employees acting within the scope of their employment,
to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, except as
provided in subsections (b) and (c), or to distribute such copy or phonorecord,
under the conditions specified by this section, if-
(1) the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of direct or
indirect commercial advantage;
(2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or (ii)
available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with
the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in
a specialized field; and
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of copyright
that appears on the copy or phonorecord that is reproduced under the
provisions of this section, or includes a legend stating that the work may be
protected by copyright if no such notice can be found on the copy or
phonorecord that is reproduced under the provisions of this section.
See also Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
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publishers can control who looks at information and whether a
page can be copied for private use. 151 Now these licenses between
parties with unequal bargaining power threaten to curtail access
to information that American libraries, both public and private,
were founded to facilitate.152 Specifically, these licenses usually
curtail interlibrary lending because many digital licenses
prohibit copying or sharing of the work. 153 Therefore, people are
unable to get information unless it is at their local library. 54
This is in direct conflict with the ability of patrons and libraries
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (2000) (noting
that library copying falls within ambit of fair use). See generally Niva Elkin-Koren,
Cyberlaw and Social Change A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14
CARDozo ARTs & ENr. L.J. 215, 266-67 (1996) (stating that because of shift in libraries'
holdings to electronic media, libraries no longer own information and are more dependent
on suppliers; this shift in way libraries are administrated is inevitable).
151 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (stating that one copy can be made of copyrighted materials
by library or archive employees); see also Steven D. Smit, "Make a Copy for the File...
Copyright Infringement by Attorneys, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1994) (noting that
Founding Fathers had recognized public utility in limiting copyright protections, included
limitation in Constitution, and quickly followed up by enacting first Copyright Act in
1790). See generally Raffi Zerounian, Bonneville International v. Peters, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 47, 67 n.131 (2002) (stating that copyright law must handle difficult task of
balancing publisher control over information with dissemination of information available
for public use).
152 See Comments by Library Associations, supra note 141 (noting that routine
library practices that were permitted under copyright law have all been restricted or
barred by license agreements); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Constituionalization of
Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 530-31 (explaining that increase in
intellectual property law has put strains on First Amendment). See generally Stephen E.
Wel, Cloning and Copyright, 19 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 147-48 (stating that
libraries may be forced to lease materials and hold them only as long as they continue
payments, as opposed to buying single hard copy and holding it indefinitely).
153 Libraries deal with so many different licenses that they are forced to treat them
all the same and under the strictest standards to simplify their uses. Therefore most
libraries simply do not allow Inter-Library Lending of digital works, regardless of what
the actual license states, because the stricter licenses do not allow for it. This way they
are not forced to reinvestigate the terms and conditions of each license each time a
Library patron asks to borrow the work. Comments by Library Associations, supra note
141. Some commentators have advocated that libraries negotiate agreements with each
other to share access to online collections in order to deal with this problem. Georgia H.
Harper, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 463-64 (1995). With the publishers in control
of their materials, the public will inevitably lose out in sharing this information without a
solution. Weil, supra note 152, at 148.
154 See Comments by Library Associations, supra note 141 (noting that this is
especially apparent for smaller libraries and public libraries in communities with limited
resources); see also Harper, supra note 153, at 151-52 (stating that without freedom to
use information under fair use doctrine, libraries would fail to fulfill their role as
providers of information to community). See generally J.H. Reichman, The Trjps
Component of the GA7T's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual
Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDEAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 171, 228 (1993) (stating that database publishers have also tried to limit inter-
library sharing of resources because sharing reduces demand for purchasing of
information).
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under 108 to make a single copy for private use. 155
Many digital licenses also prohibit libraries from archiving
works, and therefore patrons are unable to obtain and use these
works.156 It is risky for libraries to rely on content providers
because these servers are subject to corruption, sabotage,
subsequent alteration and selective preservation.157 It is entirely
likely that profit-motivated publishers will not invest in
archiving older works that may no longer be marketable on a
large commercial scale.158
LEGISLATION
Recently the Copyright Office issued a report on the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and the Office's thoughts on how the
legislation was functioning.159  The Report noted that a number
155 See Comments by Library Associations, supra note 141 (noting, however, that
libraries are able under sections 107-109 to archive "lawfully purchased works for future
use and historical preservation"); see also Gasaway, supra note 147, at 121 (stating that
first sale doctrine of Copyright Act secures libraries' important function of providing
information on all sides of issues to public). See generally Reichman, supra note 154, at
227-28 (observing that publishers monopoly on information puts them in position to
require librarians to waive copyright privileges that they are guaranteed, which limits
patrons' access to information).
156 See Comments of the Library Associations, supra note 141 (noting, however, that
they are authorized to convert some works into new formats); see also Harper, supra note
153, at 453 (stating that many publishers engage in price inflation in order to compensate
for what they believe is revenue lost from library copying permitted under section 108 of
the Copyright Act). See generally Laura N. Gasaway, Impasse: Distance Learning and
Copyrigbt 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 812 (observing difficulty of obtaining digital licenses for
distance learning use).
157 See Comments of the Library Associations, supra note 141 (noting that "if digital
works are not archived in a professional manner the risk of loss to authors and society is
enormous"); see generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 786 (2001) (stating that content providers
have difficulty controlling access to their websites); Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy
and Censorship of the Internet 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 693, 699-700 (1998) (claiming
certain uses of information permitted under fair-use doctrine could be breach of digital
licenses).
158 See Comments of the Library Associations, supra note 141 (stating that libraries
have also expressed concerns that they will lose access to digital works in event
publishers merge, cease operations, or convert existing works into new formats as
technology evolves); see generally Harper, supra note 153, at 453 (discussing concerns of
publishers over lost revenue); Katherine C. Spelman & Rachel Matteo-Boehm, Copyright
Current Developments, 691 PRAC. L.INST. PAT. 801, 852 (2002) (noting risk that
publishers may be forced to delete up to 200,000 archived articles form electronic
archives).
159 See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT: SECTION 104
REPORT, available at
http://ww w.loc.gov/copyright/report./studies/dmca/hnca executive.html (evaluating
copyright legislation); see also JeanAne Marie Jiles, Copyright Protection in the New
Mifenium: Amending the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Prevent Constitutional
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of commentators questioned the contract preemption that has
increasingly become a part of copyright law.1 60 Particularly in
the area of software licensing and online websites, the Copyright
Office noted that shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and web-wrap
agreements have become the norm and do provide some
consumer protection concerns. 1 61
Regulation is necessary
In the past, limitations have been placed on contractual
freedoms concerning bad information and public policy. 162
Similarly, it is irresponsible for Congress to allow software
providers, one of the largest industries in the United States
economy, to wait for the development of the law on an ad hoc
basis to determine whether the contracts by which they run their
businesses are in fact valid, or to continue allowing operations
with different results in different jurisdictions.163  The
Challenges, 52 ADMIN. L.REV. 443, 457 (2000) (stating that under Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, content providers will have less copyright protection than librarian's
providers). See generally Robyn E. Rebollo, So Many Products... The Explosion in Legal
Resources Has Made Sorting Out Vendor Issues More Important, LEGAL TIMES, July 15,
2002 (noting Special Library Associations recommendation that content providers should
offer alternative licensing agreements to choose from).
160 See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 159 (summarizing views received from
public through comments, reply comments, and hearing testimony); see also Keohane,
supra note 6, at 443 (stating that individually negotiated contracts have become obsolete
for mass marketed software and that shrink-wrap, click-wrap and web-wrap agreements
are designed to be efficient tools to set terms of standard transaction). See generallyNiva
Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 94 (1997) (stating that online licensing arrangements, which are easy and
cheap to monitor, could replace traditional copyright paradigm of private contracts).
161 See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 159 (evaluating concerns regarding
licensing agreements ); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.
1997) (noting that shrink-wrap agreements are industry norm). See generally Koren,
supra note 160, at 108-10 (arguing that freedom of contract rationale behind online
licensing agreements to contravene copyright protections is bad economic policy).
162 Fisher, supra note 146, at 1243-45 (demonstrating by analogy to other disciplines
that arguments in favor of strict limitations on contractual freedoms are strong and
diverse and not unprecedented). See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.REv. 563 (1982) (explaining paternalist
arguments in favor of limitations are based on theories holding that law makers know
better than their population how to protect it); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism,
84 VA. L.REv. 229, 239-40 (1998) (exploring idea that intervention may in fact preserve
individual liberty when individuals are inclined to unknowingly act to their own
detriment).
163 Murphy, supra note 123, at 563 n.28 quotingMary Jo Howard Dively, Overview of
Proposed UCC Article 2B, 557 PRAC. L.INST. PAT. 7, 9-10 (1999). See generally Das, supra
note 57, at 502 (stating that courts have examined different factors to determine liability
in click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements). But see Lawrence Lessig, Sign It and Weep,
available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,2583,00.html (issue date Nov. 20,
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jurisdictional split is especially problematic concerning the
Internet and web-wrap agreements because there is no way to
limit access to one jurisdiction while allowing access to
another. 164 Therefore, producers are required to use catch-all
contracts that conform to the nuances of each state's law.165
UCITA
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA") may answer several questions that surround software
licensing agreements.166  On July 29, 1999, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") adopted UCITA at its annual conference.167 This
means that the NCCUSL may now propose the Act to state
legislatures, and, in fact, two states have already adopted
1998) (arguing that common law process of making law over time will produce set of
standardization rules supported by reason rather than industry-controlled legislation).
164 See Wayde Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web: ICANN's Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Name Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
297, 298 (2001) (explaining that Internet has caused "multi-jurisdictional mess" that
alternate dispute resolution methods could solve); see also Darren L. McCarty, Internet
Contacts and Forum Notice: A Formula for Personal Jurisdiction, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
557, 577-80, 590 (1998) (discussing general and specific personal jurisdiction with respect
to Internet cases to conclude that specific jurisdiction is better suited to deal with
geographic Internet jurisdictional concerns); Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Dispute Resolution in
Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 676
(2000) (describing how Internet globalization frustrates traditional judicial resolution that
depends on localization to determine jurisdictional laws, since Internet transactions reach
many national and international jurisdictions).
165 See generally Keohane, supra note 6, at 455 (noting that UCITA aims to provide
uniform framework for laws from state to state); McCarty, supra note 164, at 559
(proposing that diverse geographic Internet transactions threaten traditional limits on
state judicial powers); Katy Hull, Note, The Overlooked Concern With the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1391, 1400 (2000) (cautioning
that without stable law of contract and with inconsistency from state to state software
industries will be hindered in reaching fullest potential).
166 Keohane, supra note 6, at 454 (discussing UCITA's application to software
licensing agreements). See generally Hull, supra note 165, at 1401 (noting three basic
arguments for standardization of software licensing agreement laws); Matthew J. Smith,
An Overview of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: Warranties, Self-
Help, and Contract Formation Why UCITA Should Be Renamed "The Licensors'
Protection Act" 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 389, 390 (2001) (describing process by which UCITA
originated).
167 Murphy, supra note 123, at 559 (stating that the NCCUSL adopted UCITA at its
conference in Denver, Colorado). See Smith, supra note 166, at 393 (stating that NCCUSL
presented its first UCITA draft on July 29, 1999 and made final drafts available in
October, 1999). See generally COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY,
UCITA IN THE UNITED STATES, available at
http://www.cpsr.org/program/UCITA/ucitastates.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002)
(explaining in order for UCITA to become law it must be passed in each state, and
provides updated information regarding UTICA status in each state).
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UCITA.168 UCITA is an attempt to standardize the software and
online area of commercial law similar to the UCC.169
In an attempt to mirror section 2-207, sections 207170 and
208171 of UCITA propose that a party must be granted an
168 Although two states have adopted the UCITA, others have specific statues for
addressing issues such as forum selection clauses in Internet transactions. Das, supra
note 57, at 487 n.43. Currently, only Maryland and Virginia have passed legislation on
UCITA, but Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, and Oklahoma have introduced its legislation to one or
both houses of the state Congress. Keohane, supra note 6. See Society for Information
Management, at www.simnet.org/search/ucita, for an up to date list of UCITA's status in
each state legislature.
169 Initially, UCITA was intended as an addition to the UCC as Article 2B as a
standardization of commercial law for transactions involving intangible property.
However, the proposed Article 2B met with dissatisfaction and was abandoned. The
NCCUSL then proposed a new form of this idea in UCITA. Murphy, supra note 123, at
560. Neither the UCC nor the proposed UCITA are federal law. The UCC is not a federal
statute but rather was drafted with representatives from all the states and other
important people and then proposed to state legislatures and independently enacted by
each state legislature. Consequently there are slight differences among the actual state
laws and the UCC, but nothing dramatic. UCITA is intended to work in a similar fashion.
The goal of UCITA is to set down a uniform law for all the states. It is drafted by
representatives of the states and then proposed to the state legislatures for ratification.
Therefore, it is not federal law, but state law, but it is increasingly uniform from state to
state. Keohane, supra note 6. There was a call for a new UCC because the UCC was
already an established vehicle for commercial transaction and more readily intellectually
accessible than complex licensing agreements; the courts seemed more at ease in
implementing a UCC approach to a controversy; and the simultaneous goals of gap-filling
and encouraging technology transfer would be met; and basic uniformity where areas of
intellectual property law had started to significantly overlap. Id.
170 UCITA § 207 (Formation: Releases of Informational Rights) states:
(a) A release is effective without consideration if it is:
(1) in a record to which the releasing party agrees, such as by manifesting
assent, and which identifies the informational rights released; or
(2) enforceable under estoppel, implied license, or other law.
(b) A release continues for the duration of the informational rights released if
the release does not specify its duration and does not require affirmative
performance after the grant of the release by:
(1) the party granting the release; or
(2) the party receiving the release, except for relatively insignificant acts.
(c) In cases not governed by subsection (b), the duration of a release is governed
by Section 308.
171 UCITA § 208 (Adopting Terms of Record) states
Except as otherwise provided in Section 209, the following rules apply:
(1) A party adopts the terms of a record, including a standard form, as the
terms of the contract if the party agrees to the record, such as by manifesting
assent.
(2) The terms of a record may be adopted pursuant to paragraph (1) after
beginning performance or use if the parties had reason to know that their
agreement would be represented in whole or part by a later record to be agreed
on and there would not be an opportunity to review the record or a copy of it
before performance or use begins. If the parties fail to agree to the later terms
and did not intend to form a contract unless they so agreed, Section 202(e)
applies.
(3) If a party adopts the terms of a record, the terms become part of the
contract without regard to the party's knowledge or understanding of
individual terms in the record, except for a term that is unenforceable because
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opportunity to review the contract's terms and to decline or
accept the offer.172 This opportunity to review is defined in 112(a)
("Manifesting Assent; Opportunity to Review") of the UCITA, and
states:
[A] person manifests assent to a record or term if the person,
acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to
review the record or term or a copy of it: (1) authenticates
the record or term with intent to adopt or accept it; or (2)
intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with
reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent
may infer from the conduct or statement that the person
assents to the record or term. 173
Therefore, under the terms of proposed UCITA, web-wrap
agreements would also not be enforceable because the required
opportunity to review is arguably not available and the user is
not mandated to engage in conduct or statement that the person
assents to the term.174
Problems of UCITA
While UCITA would seemingly solve the problems of web-wrap
it seems unlikely that UCITA will be enacted on a widespread
scale and become as respected and followed as the UCC.175 The
it fails to satisfy another requirement of this [Act].
172 See UCTIA 208(2). See generally Das, supra note 57, at 483 (proposing that courts
use two-prong "reasonably communicated" test to examine both physical characteristics of
forum selection clauses and consumer's ability to become meaningfully informed of
existence of such clause before enforcing forum selection clauses in favor of e-vendors);
Smith, supra note 166, at 390 (noting that there are UCITA provisions that mirror UCC
provisions).
173 Duoma, supra note 141, at 276 (challenging that assent requirements in 112(a) are
fundamentally flawed and create procedural unconscionability). See generally Hull, supra
note 165, at 1391 (cautioning that while standardization is needed, overly restrictive laws
will only hinder software industries); Smith, supra note 166, at 397-401 (detailing
background and implication of "manifestation of assent" and "opportunity of review"
terms).
174 See generally Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp., 150 F.Supp.2d 585, 596
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that in web-wrap agreements there is no affirmative assent to
agreement); Das, supra note 57, at 501 (explaining that Specht court found liability in
defendant's failure to insure that users manifest assent to terms and failure to notify
users of contract formation); Smith, supra note 166, at 399 (noting that although UCITA
provisions require manifestation of assent and opportunity to review, licensees are often
presented with additional terms post transaction without remedy).
175 See generally Hull, supra note 165, at 1391 (echoing commentator concern that
UCITA may remove consumer protections currently granted under UCC Article 2);
Murphy, supra note 123, at 574 (claiming that UCITA principles have not evolved
through case law like UCC principles); Smith, supra note 166, at 391 (submitting that
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origins of UCITA and the now abandoned Article 2B share few of
the qualities that led to the UCC's success. 176 The UCC was only
proposed after established case law and business practices had
emerged, but UCITA functions in a constantly shifting area of
computer transactions.177 UCITA has not had the widespread
support enjoyed by the UCC.178
Most important, though, are the criticisms that UCITA is
unconcerned with the average consumer. 179  Consumer
protections and possible unconscionability of substantive terms
and procedures were at the forefront of concerns when the UCC
was developed.180  Conversely, critics say that UCITA is a
"sweetheart bill for software publishers" and a compilation whose
provisions clearly favor "the companies whose lobbyists have
been sitting at the ... table."181
UCITA provisions provide software licensing industries opportunities for total control
over drafting and enforcing computer software transaction contracts).
176 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 573 (determining that the development process
used to codify UCC provisions was not adhered to in UCITA development); see also Hull,
supra note 165, at 1403 (identifying four distinct problems that UCITA does not address);
Smith, supra note 166, at 397 (commenting that UCITA replaces UCC traditional contract
formation and modification with layered contract terms requiring manifestation of
assent).
177 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 573-74 (stating that UCITA tried to codify quickly
changing area); see also Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have
We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.REV. 167, 203 (2001) (showing that UCITA areas
of concern are rapidly changing). See generally Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., An Overview of the
Virginia UCITA, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2001) (explaining that UCITA establishes
rules that do not yet exist in law).
178 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 574 ("[I1t has become apparent that this area does
not presently allow the sort of codification that is represented by the Uniform Commercial
Code."); see also Hornbuckle, supra note 24, at 847, (stating that ALI withdrew its
support of UCITA). See generally Rustad, supra note 52, at 552 (stating that UCITA is
unlikely to be adopted nationwide).
179 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 575 (stating that critics characterize UCITA as
'sweetheart bill for software publishers" and compilation whose provisions clearly favor
"the companies whose lobbyists have been sitting at the... table."). See generally Boss,
supra note 177, at 203 (noting that intrusion into intellectual property is obstacle to
adoption of UCITA). But see Kalinda Basho, Note, The Licensing of Our Personal
Information: Is it a Solution to Internet Privacy 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507, 1535 (2000)
(showing that UCITA may give average consumer rights that they would not be able to
attain themselves).
180 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 575 (stating that needs of consumers were in mind
when drafting UCC). See generally Casamiquela, supra note 8, at 489 (explaining that
federal and state governments have created acts to protect consumers). But see David A.
Kessler, Note, Investor Casualties in the War for Market EfBIciency 9 AM. U. ADMIN. L.J.
1307, 1334 (1996) (stating that consumer advocates think UCC never protected
consumers).
181 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 575 (showing that limited warranties serve to
protect customers against malfunctions only so long as software warranty lasts, and
warranties remove incentives for commercial software publishers to ensure safely running
programs that leaves consumer unprotected); see also Pratik A. Shah, Berkeley
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One of the major criticisms of UCITA is its outright approval of
click-through methods of assent.18 2 Simply clicking on "I agree"
is enough to manifest assent under UCITA.183 While this paper
does not attempt to explore the criticisms of click-wrap and click-
through agreements, it is important to note here that the
Restatement Second of Contracts warns against this problem. 84
The Restatement states that unchecked drafters of standard
form contracts may be tempted to overdraft.l8 5 Simply put, a
licensor who uses a standard form contract could include terms
that would never be permitted by a user who reviewed the
contract or negotiated its terms. 186
The American Law Institute ("ALI") expressly objected to click-
through assent when reviewing UCITA as Article 2B.187 The ALI
Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law and Technology 1 Intellectual Property,
A. Copyright The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 85, 92 (2000) (explaining that there are potential consumer protection problems). See
generally Cheon-Seok Seo, Licenses and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 146, 160 (2001) (describing consumer protection problems
arising from UCITA dealing with warranties).
182 See UCITA §112 (approving click through methods of assent); see also Ayyappan,
supra note 6, at 2472 (noting that criticism focuses on idea that UCITA is "anti-
consumer"); Brian D. McDonald, Contract Enforceability: The Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 463 (2001) (explaining wide-
spread criticism of the UCITA).
183 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 583 (showing assent is allowed through a "click-
through" method); see also Jean Braucher, Why UCITA Like Article 2B is Premature and
Unsound, available at httpYAvww.2bguide.comldocs/O499jb.html. (last visited Feb. 20,
2000) ('There is reason to question whether these are adequate formalities to carry with
them the idea of assent, particularly blanket assent to a long license when not in the
context of a bargain, but rather in the context of supposed post-purchase validation of
terms."). See generally Dourna, supra note 141, at 276 (explaining how assent is
manifested under UCITA).
184 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 583 (explaining problem with agreement
methods). See generally Jason Sheets, Copyright Misused: The Impact of the DMCA
Anti-Circumvention Measures on Fair and Innovative Markets, 23 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2000) (explaining that click-through agreements are troublesome). But see
Scott R. Zemnick, Note, The E-Sign Act- The Means to Effectively Facilitate the Growth
and Development of E-Commerce, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1965, 1990 (2001) (explaining
that handwritten agreement is no more burdensome than a click-wrap agreement).
185 See Murphy, supra note 123, at 583 (noting implications of overdrafting). See
generally John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 288-89 (2000) (explaining what is involved in standard form contract);
Donald B. King, Standard Form Contracts: A Call For Reality, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 909
(2000) (showing that these agreements are dictated by only one party).
186 See Burke, supra note 185, at 289 (explaining that some parties cannot negotiate
in standard form contracts); see also Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent in the Formation of
Information Contracts: The Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36
HOUS. L. REV. 195, 210 (1999) (noting that license terms cannot be negotiated). See
generally Ring, supra note 177, at 20-21 (discussing UCITA's application to standard form
contracts).
187 Murphy, supra note 123, at 584 (describing ALI's objection to click through
assent). See Cern Kaner, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: Sotware
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stated "the current draft of proposed UCC Article 2B has not
reached an acceptable balance in its provisions concerning assent
to standard form records and should be returned to the Drafting
Committee for fundamental revision of the several related
sections governing assent."188
While standard form contracts are favorable in the online
medium because of the contracting abilities they facilitate,189 it is
nevertheless imperative to monitor their potential for
overreaching scope. UCITA, however, encourages inequitable
contract terms. 190 At this time, it does not seem that any of the
proposed legislation will solve these consumer concerns. 191
Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 436-37 (1999)
(stating that UCITA approach was unlike traditional contracting); see also Boss, supra
note 177, at 177-78 (explaining that Article 2B received criticism by ALI).
188 Murphy, supra note 123, at 584. See LETTER FROM BUREAUS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND COMPETITION AND THE POLICY PLANNING OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL;
TRADE COMMISSION TO JOHN MCCLAUGHERTY, NCCUSL CHAIR FOR FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (last modified July 9, 1999), at http'l/www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.btm. ("UCITA
departs from an important principle of consumer protection that material terms must be
disclosed prior to the consummation of the transaction.. .UCITA does not require that
licensees be informed of licensing restrictions in a clear and conspicuous manner prior to
the consummation of the transaction."); see also Dodd, supra note 186, at 238 (stating
Article 2B does not adequately address assent).
189 See Keohane, supra note 6, at 443 (proporting that mass-market software licenses
cannot be individually negotiated and need to be standardized); see also Seo, supra note
181, at 159 (noting that standard form contract is not invalid if mass marketing license is
shown before the price is paid). See generally Goodman, supra note 8, at 334 (explaining
that mass marketing of computer software precludes negotiations).
190 See Leo L. Clarke, Performance Risk, Form Contracts and UCITA, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (showing that unfair resolution of disputes will
arise); McDonald, supra note 182, at 484 (opining that concerns will stop UCITA
legislation). See generally Rustad, supra note 52, at 581 (stating that UCITA needs to
further consumer protection).
191 While scholars and legislators argue over legislative and market concerns with
standard form contracts on the Internet, The Practicing Law Institute has put out several
interesting articles to guide lawyers and help them counsel their software clients.
First, the PLI suggests that it must be made clear to the user that a license and not
a sale is involved. This characterization should avoid any first-sale concerns by making
the doctrine inapplicable. A license, conversely, is only a right or privilege to use the
software or information for a sometimes specified period of time and conditioned upon
specified terms.
Additionally, the PLI suggests that agreement should require that the user take an
affirmative step to indicate their acceptance of the terms. If the user does not click "I
accept" they should not be allowed access to the information or software. As an additional
safeguard, some lawyers have also advised their software and Internet clients to program
the license so that the "I accept" button is not visible or accessible until after the terms
have at least been scrolled through. This in no way assures a licensor that the terms have
been read or understood, but does provide additional evidence of mutual assent.
The PLI also notes the UCC's position on warranty disclaimers. Many license
agreements expressly disclaim all implied warranties including the implied warranty of
merchantability 2-314 and the implied warranty of fitness 2-315. Noting that the UCC
requires that disclaimers of implied warranties must be conspicuous to be effective, the
PLI suggests that any online license agreements abide by that rule as well. Keohane,
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CONCLUSION
After looking more closely at web-wrap agreements and
applying the policy considerations of ProCD that found shrink-
wrap enforceable, it is clear that these agreements should be held
invalid and unenforceable. Web-wrap agreements are
sufficiently distinct from both shrink-wrap agreements and click-
wrap agreements, both in their placement on the websites, and
the lack of a requirement of affirmative assent. While market
protection was a consideration in holding shrink-wrap licenses
valid, this does not afford the consumer any protection against
web-wraps because they are adhesion contracts and in a
standard form. Not only do these agreements fail to account for
mutual assent, but they have the ability to undermine principles
of copyright law.
While some legislation has been proposed to govern the growth
of online licensing agreements, no proposed Act has gained
widespread support. However, it is interesting to note that
under all of the proposed legislation and the suggested
safeguards for attorneys given by the Practicing Law Institute,
web-wraps would be held unenforceable.
supra note 6.
None of these safeguards, however, would sufficiently validate web-wrap licenses.
All of the PLI's suggestions are directed at satisfying the second prong of mutual assent:
showing assent through conduct, while not one of the PLI's suggestions are directed at the
first prong of mutual assent and awareness of the terms where these web-wraps
inevitably fail.
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